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A Cause Worth Quitting for? The Conflict
Between Professional Ethics and Individual
Rights in Discriminatory Treatment
of Corporate Counselt
RACHEL S. ARNOW RICHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The last several decades have witnessed an increase' in the reliance on in-house
corporate legal departments, as well as a concomitant growth in the visibility and
status of in-house attorneys.2 It is now routine for companies to retain sophisticated
legal work to be performed inside,3 and for in-house attorneys4 to become integrated
and influential actors within their corporate environments.' For all of the advantages
t Copyright 2000 by Rachel S. Arnow Richman.
* Honorable Abraham L. Freedman Fellow, Temple University Beasley School of Law.
J.D., 1995, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the insightful comments and heartfelt
encouragement of my current and former colleagues Marina Angel, Clay Beery, Theresa
Glennon, Rick Greenstein, Alicia Kelly, Courtney Lytle, Finbarr McCarthy, Eleanor Myers,
Anthony Niedwiecki, and Frank Snyder. Special thanks to Jennifer Malcarney, John Nocito,
and Jennifer Falgie for their diligent research assistance and to Temple University School of
Law for its support of this project.
1. The number of lawyers working in-house increased by 40% between 1970 and 1980
and by 30% between 1980 and 1991. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal
Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46
EMORY L.J. 1057, 1059 n.5 (1997) (citing BARBARA A. CluRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER
STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s
19 (1985), and BARBARA A. CURRAN ET AL., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S.
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s 7 (1994)); see also Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes,
Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277, 277 n.1 (1985) (citing
COMM. ON THE CORPORATE LAW DEP'TS OF THE BAROF THE CrrYoF N.Y. &ARTHURYOUNG
& CO., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE LAW COMPENSATION & ORGANIZATION PRACTICES
(6th ed. 1983) [hereinafter ARTHUR YOUNG SURVEY]); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and
Public Policy: The Case of House Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449, 449 n.4 (1988)
(citing ARTHUR YOUNG SURVEY, supra); Sally R. Weaver, Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate
Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46 EMORY L.J. 1023, 1031 n.30 (1997).
2. Once considered second-tier professionals, in-house counsel now rival their law firm
counterparts in status, experience, and compensation. See Carl D. Liggio, The Changing Role
of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1203-07 (1997) (describing trends in recruitment
and compensation of in-house counsel); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement,
Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 479 (1989)
(noting increased competition in recruitment of in-house counsel and increased recognition of
in-house counsel within profession generally); see also discussion infra Part III.B.2.
3. See Liggio, supra note 2, at 1205-06 (summarizing statistics on percentages and type
of work performed in-house); see also Daly, supra note 1, at 1060 (noting expansion in
responsibilities of in-house counsel as corporations redirect work insideto avoid growing costs
associated with obtaining outside legal services).
4. This Article uses the terms "in-house attorney," "in-house counsel," and "corporate
counsel" interchangeably to refer to attorneys employed by a sole client-employer.
5. In addition to providing the usual legal services, the in-house attorney may fill the roles
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this trend provides, both to companies6 and the lawyers they employ, the retention of
in-house attorneys creates special problems in terms of the expectations and
regulations that govern attorney-client relationships. Both from an ethical perspective
and through the lens of substantive law, the issue of what legal rules control attorney
conduct, already the subject of wide debate,7 becomes increasingly complex when
forced to take account of the complicated and sometimes conflicting responsibilities
that the in-house attorney assumes.8 Of special importance to the resolution of any of
these questions is how one characterizes the attorney's role, whether primarily as
employee or as client fiduciary, and consequently her obligations both to others and
herself.
One area of particular significance to those attorneys employed as corporate
counsel, which as of yet has been given little scholarly attention,9 is the tension
between the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that govern attorney ethics" and
the rights conferred by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." While the latter
ofcorporate officer, manager, board member, and business decisionmaker. See Weaver, supra
note 1, at 1027; infra Part III.B.2. Of course, in all cases, in-house counsel also assumes the
role of an employee. The implications ofthis diversification ofthe in-house attorney's function
are discussed infra Part III.B.2.
6. From the perspective of corporate clients, the decision to utilize in-house counsel serves
its interests in maximizing access to legal representation and counseling while minimizing the
financial and transactional costs associated with hiring and managing private legal counsel. See
Alison B. Brotman & John H. Ogden, In-House Counsel: Managing the Split Personality,
ACCA DOCKET, May-June 1995, at 34, 34 (1995) (noting that chief advantage of retention of
in-house counsel is counsel's daily contact with clients, which increases counsel's ability to
provide well-informed and hence cost-effective advice); Daly, supra note 1, at 1060-61
(discussing financial advantages to reliance on in-house counsel); infra Parts III.B.2, III.C.
7. See, e.g., Special Issue, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 33 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 799, 804-18 (1992) (describing various existing systems for enforcement of lawyers'
professional obligations and outlining arguments in favor of differing regimes).
8. With respect to in-house counsel, both scholars and judges have struggled with how
to balance the in-house attorney's competing obligations and resolve the tension between
distinct bodies of law in addressing fundamental legal questions. See, e.g., United States Steel
Corp. v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 870 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983) (addressing whether in-house
counsel may have access to confidential information protected by court order to the same
extent as outside lawyers), modified, 578 F. Supp. 415 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983); Grace M. Giesel,
The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-
House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169
(1997) (addressing circumstances under which communications to in-house counsel should be
considered protected by the attorney-client privilege); discussion infra Part IV.A.1
(summarizing conflicting decisions as to whether in-house counsel may sue at common law
for wrongful discharge).
9. The question has been briefly considered in at least two articles. See Nancy J. Moore,
Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the
Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 497, 543 (1998) (concluding that counsel subject to
discrimination while employed might be required to resign at the request of the client in order
to pursue legal claims); Weaver, supra note 1, at 1048.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1998) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
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establishes a federal cause of action against one's employer for unlawful
discrimination, the former strictly limits the extent to which an attorney may pursue
interests adverse to a client or disclose information about the representation of a client
to third parties. Suppose, for instance, that a junior African-American in-house
attorney is denied a promotion within his company's legal department in favor of a
white attorney with less experience. Or suppose a female in-house attorney is
subjected on several occasions to unwanted sexual advances by a male senior
manager. Were the victim in either of these scenarios a regular employee, she 2 would
be entitled to bring a Title VII claim against her employer for unlawful
discrimination. 3 Further, the statute would protect her from retaliatory behavior by
the employer taken in response to her exercise of federal rights, and the employer
would consequently be prohibited from terminating or otherwise adversely affecting
the attorney's employment based on her claim."
In the in-house counsel context, by contrast, the nature and limits of statutory
protection are highly complicated. Whereas a regular employee faces no external
constraints in bringing a discrimination suit, the in-house attorney is arguably
prohibited by the Model Rules from initiating such a claim as it is clearly adverse to
the interests of her client." Moreover, it is unclear what information, if any, may be
pleaded in the attorney's complaint or ultimately utilized as evidence in her suit since
all information pertaining to the claim relates to the representation of a client and may
consequently be deemed confidential under the Model Rules.6 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the Model Rules and background common law grant clients the
inviolate ability to sever the attorney-client relationship at any time and for any
reason. 7 Thus, it is uncertain whether the in-house attorney may avail herself of the
protection afforded by the anti-retaliation provision of the statute in the likely event
that the client-employer wishes to terminate her as a result of her claim.
For these reasons, significant questions arise as to the relationship between the
Model Rules and Title VII 8 in situations where an in-house attorney is subject to
unlawful employment discrimination. While several cases have addressed the
viability of a cause of action by an attorney terminated for allegedly discriminatory
12. For purposes of convenience, the author has elected to use the feminine pronoun when
referring to a hypothetical in-house attorney subject to discrimination. Obviously the analysis
offered here applies equally to male in-house attorneys.
13. See infra Part I.A. (identifying the causes of action available under Title VII).
14. See infra Part I.A. (explaining the scope of protection afforded by the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII).
15. See infra Part I.B. 1. (discussing applicable conflicts of interest rules).
16. See infra Part I.B.2. (discussing applicable confidentiality rules).
17. See infra Part I.B.I. (discussing mandatory withdrawal regime).
18. Similar issues arise in the context of in-house attorneys subject to discrimination
cognizable under federal statutes other than Title VII, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), which
confer comparable rights on other protected classes of employees. See Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1999); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999). The analysis of the attorney's ability
to redress discrimination under those acts would be virtually identical to the analysis supplied
here. This Article, however, focuses uniquely on the provisions of Title VII.
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reasons, 9 few cases involve the means of relief available to employed in-house
attorneys, 20 and none have directly confronted the inevitable conflict posed by the
Model Rules in this context. This Article explores and seeks to resolve these
important issues. Part I sets the groundwork for the analysis by outlining the
privileges and constraints that apply to and govern corporate counsel. Part II outlines
and critiques current case law that concerns, but fails sufficiently to confront, the
inherent conflict between employee rights and attorney ethics resulting from
discrimination against in-house counsel, and consequently fails to provide the
necessary practical guidance to counsel who find themselves in this professional
dilemma. Part III more thoroughly explores the nature of the legal conflict by
examining the roots and implications of the rules and roles imposed on lawyers and
concludes that existing restraints on attorney conduct are insufficiently flexible to
accommodate lawyers' increased and changing responsibilities as in-house counsel
and wrongly permit clients to escape their responsibilities as employers. Finally, Part
IV proposes a doctrinal solution that would permit a corporate attorney in most
circumstances to exercise her right to be free from workplace discrimination,
including the corresponding right to escape retaliatory treatment, while still
recognizing, and in large part preserving, the client-employer's expectations of
loyalty and confidentiality in its relationship with its counsel.
I. THE COMPETING LEGAL REGIMES
The equal employment opportunity rights and attendant responsibilities of
corporate attorneys are set forth in two distinct bodies of doctrine: Title VII of the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 196421 and the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, as adopted and applied by the state court systems.' The former
19. Courts have consistently held that attorneys may pursue Title VII claims against the
firms that employ them. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, Soliscohen 983 F.2d 509 (3d
Cir. 1993) (discussing lawsuit by associate attorney against law firm alleging discriminatory
failure to admit plaintiff to partnership); Masterson v. LaBrum and Doak, 846 F. Supp. 1224
(E.D. Pa. 1993). Courts have also held that in-house attorneys may pursue post-termination
Title VII claims against corporate employers. See, e.g., Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum
Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998); Golightly-Howell v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union, 806 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1992); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 797 F. Supp.
643 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Graham v. Texasgulf, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Conn. 1987).
20. See, e.g., Douglas, 144 F.3d at 371; Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1986); Terry v. Gallegos, 926 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Tenn. 1996); Verney v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n, 903 F. Supp. 826 (M.D. Pa. 1995); see generally infra Part II.A-B.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1994).
22. The Model Rules, as promulgated by the American Bar Association, are not legally
binding, however, they constitute the majority approach to professional regulation. As of fall
1999, more than 40 states and the District of Columbia had adopted all or a significant portion
of the Model Rules, and others were in the process of so doing. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY
D. SIMONs, REGULATION OF LAWYERs: STATUTES AND STANDARDS at xxiv (2000); see also
2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: AHANDBOOK
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:101 (2d ed. supp. 1994) (noting
that some states who have declined to adopt the Model Rules have relied heavily on them in
adopting their own state codes).
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governs "employees"; and the latter, "attorneys." These bodies of law, neither of
which directly contemplate their applicability to in-house attorneys or their
relationship to one another, have fundamentally different purposes and effects which
create significant uncertainty as to the extent to which in-house counsel may oppose
unlawful discrimination in the workplace. The following section establishes the basis
for this conflict by providing an introduction to the two competing sources of
doctrinal law.
A. The Rights: Freedom from Retaliation Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlaws discriminatory treatment in the
workplace and grants aggrieved employees, including attorneys,2 a cause of action
against employers who engage in discriminatory behavior. Under the Act, it is
considered an unlawful employment practice to refuse to hire, discharge, or
"otherwise ... discriminate against any individual" on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.24 It is also unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any employee because that individual has filed a charge against the employer,
opposed an unlawful employment practice, or has assisted in any investigation or
proceeding regarding an alleged violation.' Thus, the statute creates a cause of action
whereby employees may oppose discriminatory practices and, significantly, it
protects the right to engage in oppositional conduct by insulating employees from
retaliatory behavior by the employer.26
To sustain a prima facie case of retaliation, the employee need merely show that
she engaged in good faith in conduct protected under the statute, that she suffered an
adverse employment action, and that the action was causally connected to her act of
opposition.27 The burden then shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory
rationale for its action, which the employee may try to rebut as pretextual. 8 The
23. See Ezold, 983 F.2d at 509; Masterson, 846 F. Supp. at 1224.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
25. See id. § 2000e-3(a).
26. This section generally refers to "oppositional" conduct as opposed to "participatory"
conduct, which is also protected under the anti-retaliation provision. A suit for retaliation for
participatory conduct would proceed under the same doctrinal structure applicable to
oppositional conduct-retaliation claims. However, because the conduct at issue in this Article
involves opposition to discriminatory treatment of in-house counsel, the term oppositional
conduct will be used here. For a discussion of the distinctions between oppositional and
participatory conduct, see generally I BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 651-65 (3d ed. 1996).
27. See Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989);
Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984); Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 672-78 (describing the elements of a retaliation claim).
28. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1313; Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354; Grant, 622 F.2d at 46. See
generallyLNDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 672-78. This burden of proof structure
is comparable to the three-part framework for proving and analyzing disparate treatment cases.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
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creation of this cause of action, and the relative ease with which a prima facie case
can be established, serve as a safeguard in effectuating the legislation's overriding
purposes of eliminating and preventing workplace discrimination. 29 Because the
dominant background rule continues to be employment at will,30 the absence of a
statutory prohibition against retaliation would render the primary cause of action for
discrimination meaningless, as employers would remain free to stifle oppositional
conduct by terminating or otherwise altering the working conditions of its
employees.3 The anti-retaliation provision, therefore, enables employees to
meaningfully oppose unlawful conduct by eliminating the employer's otherwise
unbridled power to terminate the employment relationship.
Notably, the protection afforded by the anti-retaliation clause is far-reaching, both
in terms of the range of employees who might invoke its protection and the
limitations placed on employers who might otherwise respond adversely to an
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
29. "From the outset, Congress has said that '[t]he purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate,
through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in
employment based on race, color, religion or national origin."' TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 71 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2401); see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) ("The dominant purpose
of [Title VII] ... is to root out discrimination in employment.").
30. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908) ("The right of an employ[ee]
to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employ[ee]."). It should
be noted, however, that most jurisdictions recognize a growing number of exceptions to the
common law doctrine, including implied contracts (based upon oral promises, handbooks, or
the parties' course of dealing); violation of public policy; and the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. For a discussion of these exceptions and their eroding effect on the at-
will doctrine, see, for example, Deborah L. Markowitz, The Demise ofAt- WillEmployment and
the Public Employee Conundrum, 27 URB. LAW. 305 (1995) (exploring the law's growing
trend to limit an employer's ability to terminate at will); Cortlan H. Maddux, Note,
EMPLOYERS BEWARE! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an Exception to
Employment At Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197 (1997) (exploring employees' increasing use of
promissory estoppel to alter the at-will relationship and seek relief for wrongful discharge). See
generally Maureen S. Binetti et al., The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions
Swallowed the Rule?, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999, at 441 (PLI Litig. Course
Handbook Series No. H-600, 1999) (outlining common implied limitations on an employer's
discretion to terminate at-will employees); MarkE. Brossman & Laurie C. Malkin, Beyond the
Implied Contract: The Public Policy Exception, The Implied Covenant ofGoodFaith and Fair
Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer's Discretion in the At-Will Setting, in
WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS 1999, supra, at 587 (same). But see, e.g., Joseph Z.
Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments-At-Will Termination of
Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L. REV. 437 (1995) (recognizing recent
judicial rulings and trends which have sustained the doctrine of employment-at-will in the face
of growing statutory regulation of the work place).
31. See Jones, 793 F.2d at 726 ("[S]ince the enforcement of Title VII rights necessarily
depends on the ability of individuals to present their grievances without the threat of retaliatory
conduct by their employers, rigid enforcement of [the retaliatory discharge provision] is
required."); Hanson v. Hoffmann, 628 F.2d 42,52 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969).
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employee's invocation ofstatutory rights. An employee may deserve protection under
the statute simply because she makes a complaint to a supervisor or invokes an
internal grievance procedure,32 even if she never initiates legal action. 33 The subject
of the complaint need not be the victim herself, and retaliation is cognizable even if
it occurs following opposition to the treatment of co-workers or general office
policies.34 Most importantly, retaliation claims are recognized even where the conduct
complained of by the employee is ultimately found to have been lawful.35 The
employee need only have a reasonable and good faith belief that the conduct he or
she opposed was an unlawful employment practice.36
That is not to say that all conduct in opposition to allegedly discriminatory behavior
is protected. Courts have recognized that the manner in which an employee engages
in oppositional conduct may become so disruptive and debilitating to the employer's
business as to render the conduct unprotected under the statute.3" Where such a
32. See Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990); Sias v.
City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 694-96 (9th Cir. 1978).
33. See Hearn v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 460 F. Supp. 546, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
("[Title VII] was not intended to penalize employees who seek to improve the conditions of
the work place through informal methods rather than entangling the employer in a potentially
lengthy and expensive Commission proceeding."). For a discussion of the scope of protected
activity under Title VII, see generally LMnEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, 658-67;
MelissaA. Essary & TerenceD. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA4, and
the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv.
115, 121-32 (1998); Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New Protected
Class, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 405, 409-13 (1997).
34. See, e.g., Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)
(treating in-house counsel-plaintiff's conduct as "protected" where counsel discussed with
upper management the EEO implications of personnel policies, including management's
treatment of women); Robinson v. SEPTA, 982 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that
employee's letter to congressman complaining about harassment of black employees was
oppositional conduct within the meaning of Title VII); EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720
F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that employee's letter to employer's customer
protesting an affirmative action award by employer was a"statutorily protected expression of
'opposition'); Federoff v. Walden, No. C-2-78-181, 1978 WL 34 *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24,
1978) (finding that employee's support of a co-worker's EEOC claim was protected from an
employer's retaliation under Title VII).
35. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1314-16; Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1013 ("[O]pposition
clause protection will be accorded whenever the opposition is based on a 'reasonable belief
that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice."); Parker v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
36. See Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590,
593 (2d Cir. 1988); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140
(5th Cir. 1981).
37. See, e.g., Rosser v. Laborers' Int'l Union, Local No. 438, 616 F.2d 221,223 (5th Cir.
1980).
There may arise instances where the employee's conduct in protest of an unlawful
employment practice so interferes with the performance of his job that it renders
him ineffective in the position for which he was employed. In such a case, his
conduct, or form of opposition, is not covered by [Title VII's] § 704(a).
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defense is alleged, the court balances the statute's purpose and the need to protect
individual rights against the employer's need to maintain a productive work
environment to determine whether the manner of the employee's opposition is
reasonable. 8 This test, however, has been narrowly applied to exclude only a limited
range of activity in particular circumstances. The mere assertion that an employee's
oppositional conduct was "disloyal" toward the employer has been held insufficient
to justify depriving the employee of the statute's protection.39 Rather, conduct is
excluded only where the manner in which the employee engages in protest goes
beyond oppositional behavior and can itself be considered a legitimate basis for
termination.40 Thus, illegal conduct, conduct that consciously seeks to sabotage the
employer's enterprise, or conduct that causes an employee to neglect job
responsibilities or unduly disrupt co-workers in performing their duties may fall
outside the statute's protection.
41
The definition of adverse employment action is also broad. The acts of employers
that may constitute retaliatory behavior comprise the range of behaviors associated
with discriminatory treatment, including termination of employment, failure to hire
or promote, imposition of or failure to grant leave, forced transfers, and changes in
benefits or compensation.42 Some courts have held that even actions that have only
38. See Rollins v. Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
("Th[e] determination of reasonableness is made on a case by case basis by balancing the
purpose of the statute and the need to protect individuals asserting their rights thereunder
against an employer's legitimate demands for loyalty, cooperation and a generally productive
work environment.").
39. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1014.
40. See Rollins, 868 F.2d at 401 ("If, under this balancing test, the manner in which the
employee complains is found to be unreasonable, it falls outside the protection of the statute;
the employee's conduct then may be deemed an independent, legitimate basis for the [alleged
adverse action]."); see also Rosser, 616 F.2d at 223. In these types of cases, therefore, the
employer will generally assert the defense of a nonpretextual basis for the alleged retaliatory
behavior in addition to claiming that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because
the alleged oppositional conduct falls outside the statute's protection.
41. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 341 (8th Cir. 1972) ("[W]e find
no suggestion that [Title VII] protection extends to activities which run afoul of the law."),
vacated on other grounds, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Rollins, 868 F.2d at 401 (holding that
employee's conduct fell outside the scope of Title VII where employee's repeated false claims
"antagonized her supervisors and colleagues and impaired the morale of her unit"); Hochstadt
v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding
employee's participation in political activity for women's liberation on company time
unprotected under opposition clause); Armfield v. Runyon, 902 F. Supp. 823, 827 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (determining that a postal employee's threats of assault against asupervisorjustified the
employee's termination). See generally Brian J. Kreiswirth, CaseNote, Justifiable Limitations
on Title VllAnti-Retaliation Provisions, 107 YALE L.J. 2339, 2342 (1998).
42. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Board of Educ., 620 F.2d 362, 364-66 (2d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing school board's transfer ofateacher as adverse employment action where teacher's
twenty years of experience were useless at new location with new students); Daines v. City of
Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 699-700 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding retaliatory action where
employer implemented more burdensome selection procedure resulting in failure to promote
previously eligible female plaintiff). For a general discussion of the scope of employer action
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a tangential effect on a victim's employment, such as changes in responsibility which
do not involve alteration in benefits, compensation or status, may be evidence of
retaliatory behavior.43 Once a claim of retaliation is successfully established, the
employee is entitled to the full panoply of remedies available under Title VII."
In this way, the retaliation provision of Title VII effectively insulates a broadly
described group of employees from significant alteration in the terms and conditions
of their employment. Once an employee legitimately invokes the statute, the
retaliation provision alters the reciprocal nature of the relationship, eliminating the
employer's ability to terminate the relationship at will and granting the employee a
specialized form of job security. Such a result ensures that the fear or threat of
financial harm and professional discredit do not deter employees in their pursuit of
equal treatment and that employers do not avoid compliance by such means. The
statute preserves the employment relationship in the face of conflict and locates the
power to alter that relationship primarily in the employee, who is now able to engage
freely in the conduct that will ideally remedy the problem of discrimination.
B. The Rules: Attorney Ethics and the Duties
of Confidentiality and Loyalty
While Title VII grants employees, including in-house attorneys,4s the power to
oppose and redress acts of discrimination, in-house attorneys are also subject to the
that may constitute retaliation, see generally LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 668-
78; Essary & Friedman, supra note 33, at 132-42; Ray, supra note 33, at 414-20.
43. See Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 702-04 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining that
employer's lateral transfer of employee that involved loss of privileges but did not result in
reduced pay orbenefits could be retaliatory conduct); Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 890
n.67 (D.D.C. 1981) (finding adverse action including "removal of [plaintiff's] office to an
undesirable location; failure to provide [plaintiff] with appropriate training; and failure to
classify [plaintiff's] position at a grade comparable to that of other security specialists in the
Navy with similar functions"). A growing number of courts have held, however, that to be
cognizable as retaliation, the alleged adverse behavior must comprise an "ultimate employment
decision." See, e.g., Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997);
Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). Thus, complaints
involving negative comments by superiors, interim performance evaluations, teasing, or
general hostility from co-workers or superiors have been held not to constitute retaliation. See,
e.g., Mattern, 127 F.3d at 707 ("Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and
resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and
therefore are not the required adverse employment actions."); Drake v. Minnessota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no adverse action in "shunning" of
employee by co-workers); Martin v. Kroger Co., 65 F. Supp. 2d 516, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
("[N]egative performance evaluations and placement on probation, even if undeserved, are not
adverse employment actions giving rise to an actionable retaliation claim.").
44. In addition to back pay, reinstatement, and other equitable relief, successful claimants
may now receive limited punitive and compensatory damages under the 1991 Civil Rights Act
amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (1 994). For ageneral discussion of the remedies available
under Title VII, see generally 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 1741-1914; Ray,
supra note 33, at 429-32.
45. See infra note 76.
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ethical rules that govern all lawyers.' These rules are generally found in the state-
adopted version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and have their roots in
the common law of agency and fiduciary duties.47 Two primary codified obligations
of the attorney, the duties of loyalty and confidentiality, have particular relevance to
the problem of discrimination against employed counsel. These obligations are
imposed primarily to preserve the trust and confidence considered essential to the
attorney-client relationship and are broadly construed to benefit the client.48 Thus,
unlike Title VII which alters the balance of power in the employment relationship in
favor of the employee-attorney, the rules of professional responsibility by and large
place the client's interests above those of its attorney. Therefore, the rights available
to in-house counsel and the rules that govern them are squarely at odds with one
another with respect to the employee-attorney's ability to oppose discrimination by
her employer-client.
1. Duty of Loyalty
An attorney owes a duty of loyalty to her client under which she must avoid
conflicts of interest. As codified under the Model Rules,49 an attorney is prohibited
from pursuing representation and other interests that may be adverse to an existing
client."0 Rule 1.7(a) prohibits an attorney from representing a client "if the
representation of that client-will be directly adverse to another client" unless the
attorney reasonably believes the representation will not be so affected and both clients
46. As previously noted, the Model Rules do not expressly contemplate their applicability
to in-house attorneys. However, courts and commentators alike have generally treated the rules
as equally applicable to all members of the bar, including those attorneys employed by their
clients. See In re Capps, 297 S.E.2d 249, 250 (Ga. 1982); Brian D. Forrow, The Corporate
Law Department Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity, 34 Bus. LAW. 1797,1798-1804 (1979); Grace
M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma ofIn-House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
535, 535-36 (1992).
47. See, e.g., Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1282-86
(Pa. 1992) (citing common law fiduciary duties as the basis for preventing attorneys from
representing a former client's business competitor). See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 4.1 (1986); L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty
ofLoyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980). The rules themselves are in large part the codification
of substantial state case law concerning the attorney-client relationship that predates both the
Model Rules and its forerunner, the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969)
[MODEL CODE]. See I HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 22, §206.
48. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 47, § 4.1 (discussing the need for a client to have
trust and confidence in the attorney-client relationship).
49. This Article's treatment of the applicable ethical precepts focuses on the Model Rules
and relevant common law as an example of the majority approach to state ethical regulation.
It should also be noted that at least one court has suggested that the Model Rules and Model
Code are themselves controlling in federal court, which is where Title VII suits will invariably
be brought. See In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (refusing to
rely solely on Texas disciplinary rules and concluding that "national standards of attorney
conduct" apply in reviewing disqualification motion related to antitrust litigation).
50. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7.
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consent s' The concept of adverse representation, as derived from the common law,
is extremely broad. In addition to the representation of opposing interests in the same
matter, 2 which is nearly always prohibited, 3 adverse representation includes the
simultaneous representation of clients adverse to each other in different matters,
whether or not the matters are related.'4
Further, under Rule 1.7(b), an attorney may not represent a client if the
representation "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests.""s Generally, this rule
prohibits an attorney from taking on any representation that may ultimately impair
her ability to perform zealously on behalf of an existing client in the absence of
consent from both clients. 6 It also broadly prohibits conflicts arising from the
personal interests of the lawyer. These conflicts typically involve the personal
business or financial interests of the attorney" and may also involve situations where
51. Id Rule 1.7(a).
52. See In Re Blatt, 201 A.2d 715, 716 (N.J. 1964) (finding attorney's conduct unethical
when he switched representation from plaintiff to defendant in the same matter); cf Hull v.
Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualifying a law firm prosecuting civil rights
claim against corporate defendant from representing defendant's in-house counsel who had
previously worked on defense of same claim and sought to intervene in action as a plaintiff).
There are relatively few cases holding expressly that it is unethical to represent opposing
parties in the same matter; the dearth is most likely due to the obviousness of the proposition.
See Santa Clara County Council Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1155 (Cal.
1994).
53. Conflicts involving directly adverse interests in the same matter are generally
considered unwaivable, whereas conflicts involving opposing interests in different matters,
particularly where the matters are unrelated, might be avoided by obtaining proper consent
from both clients. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 47, § 2.2. Cf MODEL RULES, supra
note 10, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5 ("7,V]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should
not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly
ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.").
54. See In re Bentley, 688 P.2d 601 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that an attorney improperly
initiated simultaneous but unrelated suits on behalf of two separate clients against each other);
In re Hailey 473 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. 1985) (holding that it is impermissible to represent client
in divorce proceeding and at same time represent estate seeking to avoid contract with divorce
client for purchase of property); MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(a) cmt. 7.
55. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis added).
56. For instance, the rule prevents an attorney from representing multiple parties in a suit
or transaction who may ultimately have diverging interests without proper consent. See, e.g.,
In re Thornton, 421 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1980) (suspending a lawyer for representing a driver and his
passengers in a suit against the other driver in an auto collision, and for filing false documents
with regard to obtaining his clients' consent for the multiple representation); North Carolina
State Bar v. Whitted, 347 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a lawyer can be
disbarred for, among other things, failing to disclose the possible effect of his multiple
representation to two wrongful death claimants who were obtaining settlement from a limited
fund).
57. See, e.g., Dixon v. State Bar, 653 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1982) (deciding that a lawyer violated
conflict of interest rule by purchasing real estate from a client which was adverse to another
client, without the latter's consent); In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1978) (reprimanding a
lawyer for dual representation of vendor and purchaser in real estate transaction where the
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an attorney's performance may be compromised due to nonfinancial personal
interests or relationships. 8 Thus, under the Model Rules and extant case law, an
attorney must not only avoid situations that are clearly or potentially adverse to an
existing 9 client, she must forego any personal interests or obligations to non-clients
that could possibly impair the quality of her representation.
Significantly, each of these broad prohibitions expressly places the power in the
hands of the client to determine whether the attorney may pursue arguably adverse
interests and continue the current representation. Specific and knowing consent ofthe
client must be obtained after full disclosure,' and where it is impossible for the
attorney to make a complete disclosure, consent cannot be requested.6 Pursuing
conflicting interests in the absence of consent constitutes a violation of the rules
which could subject the attorney to discipline.62 Thus, it is the client, who in the case
of corporate counsel is also the employer, who has the authority to determine whether
and to what extent an attorney may pursue other interests, including personal
interests, that might be adverse to the interests of the client.
In addition to vesting the client with this power, the Model Rules require that the
attorney withdraw from representation in the event that her continued representation
would cause her to violate an ethical rule.63 Therefore, if the attorney-employee
perceives that pursuit of personal interests unsanctioned by the client-employer will
purchaser was funded by federally guaranteed financing and the lawyer failed to properly
disclose his interest in the real estate). In addition, the Model Rules separately prohibit an
attorney from engaging in a business transaction with a client or acquiring a business interest
adverse to a client without proper consent. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.8(a).
58. See In re Swihart, 517 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. 1988) (holding that a lawyer improperly
represented a pregnant woman in placing her expected child with adoptive parents after the
lawyer and his wife became interested in adopting the child themselves).
59. It should be noted that attorneys must also avoid, in some instances, representation
adverse to a former client. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.9. Because this Article
focuses specifically on the problem of an in-house attorney's ethical obligations while
employed, the law concerning successive representation is not discussed here. For information
on successive conflicts, see generally WOLFRAM, supra note 47, § 7.4.
60. See, e.g., In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1974) (deciding that lawyer improperly
represented both vendor and purchaser without fully advising them of facts and areas of
potential conflict or obtaining clients' consent); In re Galton, 615 P.2d 317 (Or. 1980) (holding
that a lawyer improperly advised a client to invest with another client without disclosing his
attorney-client relationship with the investee).
6 1. Such a situation might arise where duties of confidentiality to an existing client prohibit
the attorney from revealing information necessary for the other client to understand the
potential conflict. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5.
62. See id. Rule 1.7(a)(2). There is wide national disparity among the standards for
disciplinary sanctions. However, in most states today, unified statewide disciplinary systems
are in effect. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 47, §§ 3.1-.6. The Model Rules state only
that "whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a
sanction, depend on all the circumstances." MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Scope. Most states
have adopted some variation of American Bar Association recommendations put forth by the
ABA in 1979, 1985, and 1989 with regard to organizational structure and procedural systems.
See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 22, § 206 (introduction).
63. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.16 cmt 2.
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cause her to run afoul of Rule 1.7(b), she must either forego those interests or resign
from her position. At the same time, the client-employer remains free, according to
the rules, to discharge the attorney for the perceived disloyalty, or for other reasons,
or for no reason at all.' On the other hand, where an intended withdrawal is elective
rather than compelled by the danger of an ethical violation, the attorney may not
withdraw if the withdrawal will adversely affect the interests of the client. 65 Thus, the
attorney-client relationship is an "at will" arrangement from the perspective of the
client. The attorney's ability to pursue or terminate representation is constrained by
her client's interests; however, the client may hire or fire her at any time.
2. Duty of Confidentiality
In addition to the duty of loyalty embodied in Rule 1.7, an attorney is constrained
by a strict duty of confidentiality both during the existence of the attorney-client
relationship and after its termination. As codified in Rule 1.6, an attorney may not
reveal "information relating to representation of a client" unless the client consents
after consultation or disclosure is impliedly authorized for purposes of carrying out
the representation.' Confidential information is, thus, broadly identified as anything
related to the representation, whether or not communicated to the attorney by the
client in confidence.6' If the information pertains to the client and any matter in which
the attorney is involved, it is arguably confidential. 8
Only two narrow exceptions to this general maxim are contemplated by Rule 1.6.69
Disclosure in the absence of consent may be undertaken for purposes of preventing
the client from committing a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm." Disclosure is permitted but not required in such a situation
and is sharply limited to prevention of future crimes of significant magnitude. "1 The
64. See id. Rule 1.16(a)(3).
65. See id Rule 1.16(b).
66. Id. Rule 1.6(a).
67. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt 5.
68. In this respect, the duty of confidentiality is much broader than the evidentiary
attorney-client privilege. The principle of confidentiality binds the lawyer at all times with
respect to any information related to the representation of a client. The attorney-client privilege
is an evidentiary privilege that prevents an attorney from being compelled to testify regarding
communications with her client involving the provision of legal advice. For a general
discussion explaining the distinction between the duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client
privilege, see generally X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1304-10 (E.D. Va. 1992); 1
HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 22, at 134-37, 142.9-10.
69. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(b). The Model Rules elsewhere provide
that an attorney must also reveal confidential information where necessary to comply with her
duties of candor toward the tribunal, see id. Rule 3.3(b), and suggest that an attorney may
reveal limited information to the tribunal. Those rules, however, are not implicated by the in-
house counsel discrimination problem.
70. See id Rule 1.6(b)(1).
71. A number of states, however, have adopted versions of the rule that permit disclosure
of any future crime or future fraud. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(c)(1) (1996) ("A lawyer may reveal such information to the extentthat the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
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other exception involves disputes between the attorney and client. Rule 1.6(b)(2)
permits a lawyer to disclose confidential information "to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client," to
respond to criminal or civil claims involving the lawyer's conduct, or to respond to
allegations in a proceeding concerning the representation of a client. As derived from
the common law, this exception generally contemplates situations such as a client's
suit against its attorney for malpractice, charges against the attorney in connection
with wrongdoing of the client, or proceedings by an attorney to recover unpaid fees. 2
In those situations, the use of confidential information by the attorney in pursuit of
her claim or defense necessarily occurs after the termination of the attorney-client
relationship.
As in the context of attorney loyalty, the client has a tight hold on the reins that
restrict the attorney's ability to engage in behavior unfavorable to the client where
confidential information is at issue. Where confidential information does not fall into
the narrow exceptions contemplated by Rule 1.6(b)(1), but maintaining silence would
otherwise compromise an attorney's ability to ethically represent her client, the
attorney's only remedy is to withdraw.' In such a situation, the duty of
confidentiality will survive the duration of the attorney-client relationship.74
Moreover, where disclosure is permitted under a recognized exception, the attorney
is still obligated to limit the disclosure to the necessary persons or tribunal and avail
herself of appropriate protective orders to limit the potential harm to the client. 5
Termination of the attorney-client relationship remains the prerogative of the client
whenever a dispute arises with respect to revelation of confidential information.
Given this structure, the rules of ethics create a very different balance of power
between the attorney and client than that enabled between the employer and
employee under Title VII. The conflict of interest rules seemingly demand absolute
attorney loyalty, which can be enforced at the will of the client. Whereas Title VII,
through its anti-retaliation provision, sanctions a species of "disloyal" behavior, that
is, oppositional conduct intended to eradicate perceived discrimination, the Model
Rules would prohibit an attorney-employee from pursuing any outside or personal
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another."). Some also permit disclosure to rectify
past fraud that the lawyer had unknowingly facilitated. See id. Rule 1.6(c)(2).
72. See, e.g., Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 532 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1976)
(permitting lawyer to proceed to trial and reveal client confidences necessary to collect his fee
for legal services rendered); In re Robeson, 652 P.2d 336, 344 (Or. 1982) (deciding that
attorney was free to testify as to attorney-client communications to the extent that they were
relevant to his defense against charges of unethical conduct); MODEL RULES, supra note 10,
Rule 1.6 cmt. 18 (explaining confidentiality exception enabling attorney to respond to claims
or disciplinary charges alleging attorney complicity in client conduct or other attorney
misconduct involving the representation of a client).
73. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.16(b)(I)-(3); cf id. Rule 1.13(c) (providing
that withdrawal, as opposed to disclosure, is the proper course of action where an
organizational client insists upon acting in a manner that violates the law and is likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization despite the lawyer's remonstrations).
74. See id. Rule 1.6.
75. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 18.
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interests either directly or potentially adverse to her client-employer. Moreover, while
Title VII seeks to preserve the status quo employment relationship, the Model Rules
establish a default withdrawal regime. Where conflict arises between employer and
employee over alleged discriminatory behavior, the statute prohibits the employer
from terminating or adversely altering the employment status of the objecting party
on the basis of the protected conduct. Where conflict arises between attorney and
client, the client has the absolute right to terminate the relationship.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED AND
QUESTIONS DEFLECTED
Given the existence of these parallel yet potentially conflicting doctrines, what
rights and obligations govern an in-house attorney subject to workplace
discrimination? The question begs both a pragmatic and academic consideration of
the governing laws and their purposes. On a practical level, it is unclear whether an
in-house attorney may oppose discrimination while employed and what information
she can use in pursuing that claim. This leaves the in-house attorney with little
incentive to oppose discrimination in the workplace, for in doing so she risks the
nonredressable termination of her employment and has no guarantee that she will be
able to pursue her claim to its fullest. From a broader perspective, the conflict
implicates the profession's concept of loyalty: how it relates to the attorney-client and
employer-employee relationships, its breadth, characteristics, and justifiable
limitations.
The following Part explores courts' responses to cases involving in-house attorneys
who engage in what would otherwise be considered protected conduct under Title
VII. As demonstrated below, the existing case law betrays two different and largely
inconsistent analytical approaches: courts either avoid the ethical rules or use the
rules to prohibit the exercise of Title VII rights. The few decisions dealing with
attorneys who bring Title VII claims while employed have generally fashioned fact-
specific results that ignore the Model Rules and the ethical dimension of the
problem.76 At the same time, a recent case involving an attorney who engaged in
internal protests of discriminatory behavior has held that conduct by attorneys in
76. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986); Terry v. Gallegos, 926
F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Tenn. 1996); Verney v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 903 F. Supp.
826 (M.D. Pa. 1995); see also infra Part II.A. While discrimination and harassment claims by
attorneys are far from rare, most reported cases involving such claims arise after the individual
attorney is terminated. See, e.g., Kier v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 808 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir.
1987); Kocher v. Acer Inc., No. C-93-20132 RMW (PVT), 1993 WL 149077 (N.D. Cal. May
7, 1993); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. II. 1992). In those situations, while
an attorney retains obligations of confidentiality toward her former client-employer, her duties
of loyalty are fundamentally different. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7, with
id. Rule 1.9.
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opposition to workplace discrimination and in violation of the ethical rules is never
protected under Title VII." Thus, the existing cases fail to provide a uniform
approach or a satisfactory analysis of the conflict.78
A. Rules Avoided: Analysis of Attorney Claims
Through the Title VII Burden of Proof Structure
Those Title VII decisions dealing with in-house attorneys who initiate legal action
while employed have focused on the legitimacy of the employer's proffered reasons
for its behavior as in the context of a typical workplace discrimination dispute. In
Jones, for instance, a licensed attorney employed as an Equal Employment
Opportunity ("EEO") manager in a private company filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging sexual harassment and other forms
of discrimination against her employer-client.79 Upon learning of the charge, the
company immediately suspended her, citing "conflict of interest" concerns.8 Shortly
thereafter, the employer-client discovered that the plaintiff had invited other female
employees to join her in a threatened class action suit, and terminated her." The
plaintiff brought suit, claiming both discrimination and retaliation.82
In analyzing the plaintiff's retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit did not address the
conflict between the Model Rules and the availability of Title VII relief to employed
attorneys, but instead concluded on the merits of the case that the defendant had
presented sufficient evidence to rebut the plaintiff's claim of retaliation. 3 The court
determined that the plaintiff was legitimately fired for her inappropriate behavior in
threatening and inciting class action litigation." It explicitly declined to address
whether the defendant would have been justified in firing the plaintiff based solely
on her filing of the charge85 and ignored completely the question whether an in-
77. See Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364,376-77 (5th
Cir. 1998); see also infra Part II.B.
78. The use of the word conflict here refers to the general problem of resolving the
competing interests at stake between the two bodies of law implicated by the in-house counsel
discrimination problem. It is unclear whether an actual conflict of law exists that would require
consideration of principles of federal preemption. Preemption has been alluded to by courts
asserting the general proposition that attorneys are not exempt from the federal civil rights
laws. See, e.g., Stinneford v. Spiegel Inc., 845 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (noting
that "the Supremacy clause demands that the federally mandated protection of the [Age
Discrimination in Employment Act] triumph over the state principle of at-will employment"
in concluding that terminated in-house attorney could pursue age discrimination claim against
former employer); Rand, 797 F. Supp. at 647. However, no court dealing with the limits of
protection afforded to employed in-house attorneys has invoked these concerns. An analysis
of the problem from the perspective of constitutional federalism is therefore beyond the scope
of this Article.
79. Jones, 793 F.2d at 716.
80. Id at 717.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 718.
83. See id. at 730.
84. See id. at 725-29.
85. See id. at 726 ("We need not address ourselves... to whether Flagship's response, if
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house attorney who initiates suit against her current employer places herself outside
the protection of Title VII.
To the extent the court treated the specifics of the conflict of interest offered in
justification of the company's behavior, it did so in light of the plaintiff's position as
an EEO manager as opposed to her duties as an attorney. 6 In response to the
argument that the plaintiff's solicitation of employees was itself protected conduct,
the court invoked the balancing test utilized to determine whether the manner in
which an employee protests discrimination is unreasonable"7 and concluded that in
the case at hand the attorney's conduct fell outside the scope of the statute."8 In so
doing, the court alluded to the plaintiff's familiarity with other discrimination claims
against the employer and her own representation of the company in those
proceedings.8 9 However, it treated these factors not as violations of an attorney's
professional obligations but as undermining the "great confidence" which employers
repose in their "EEO personnel."" In a leap unsupported by any factual information
contained in the decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff's conduct "critically
harmed [the employer]'s posture in the defense of discrimination suits brought
against the company" and rendered the plaintiff "ineffective [for] the position for
which she was employed."9 In this way, the court deflected the critical question
whether an in-house attorney may be terminated for engaging in protected conduct,
purporting instead to treat the issue as one involving a fact-specific determination
about the scope of protection afforded to an employee charged with EEO
responsibilities.
A somewhat similar approach, yielding a different outcome, was taken by the
district court in Verney.' There, an in-house attorney filed a charge for discriminatory
failure to promote, and was terminated two years later while her case was pending in
court.93 She subsequently filed aretaliation complaint against her employer-client and
based on Jones' filing of the charges alone, was sufficiently excessive to constitute unlawful
retaliation.") (emphasis in the original).
86. The court's failure to explicitly treat Jones as an attorney and evaluate her attendant
ethical obligations seems almost disingenuous in light of the factual evidence presented in the
case, including the employer's discharge letter to Jones and the employer's oral testimony at
trial, which indicate thatthe company's concerns stemmed from the perceived conflict between
the plaintiffs obligations as its attorney and her pursuit and encouragement of adverse
litigation. References to such evidence, however, are found only in the footnotes to the court's
opinion. See ide at 717 n.3, 726 n.14.
87. See supra Part I.A.
88. See Jones, 793 F.2d at 728 (observing that "'It]here may arise instances where the
employee's conduct in protest of an unlawful employment practice so interferes with the
performance of his job that it renders him ineffective in the position for which he was
employed. In such a case, his conduct, or form of opposition, is not covered by [the retaliation
provision]') (alterations added) (quoting Rosserv. Laborers' Int'l Union ofN.Am., LocalNo.
438, 616 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1980)).
89. See Jones, 793 F.2d at 728.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Verney v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 903 F. Supp. 826, 826 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
93. See id. at 828.
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several individual employees.94 During discovery, one ofthe defendants admitted that
the plaintiff's lawsuit was one of the factors leading to the employer's decision to
terminate her.95
In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant did not deny that the plaintiff's
suit played a part in its decision, but asserted that the plaintiffs discharge was due to
a number of factors, including
an erosion of trust and confidence in her ability to serve as an attorney, evidenced
by her (1) surreptitious documentation of conversations with... employees.._;
(2) her inability to deal with outside counsel; (3) withdrawal from other members
of the legal department... ; and (4) actions that reflected poor judgment [and]
unwillingness to take direction or criticism."
The court agreed that these reasons would constitute legitimate bases for termination
if true,97 but failed to discuss the ethical rules or the fact that the reasons asserted by
the defendants directly implicated the trust and loyalty which the rules and common
law so vehemently safeguard. The court reasonably declined to read Jones as
permitting termination based solely on the filing of a claim98 and, applying Title VII's
shifting burdens of proof, denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment on
grounds that issues of fact existed as to whether the reasons offered for the
termination were legitimate or pretextual. 9 In this way, the Verney court resolved the
particular matter before it by forcing the parties to a factual showdown regarding the
presence or absence of pretext rather than providing guidance on the threshold issues
regarding the applicability of statutory protection.
Thus both Jones and Verney involve fact patterns that clearly implicate the
conflicting duties owed between attorney and client in the context of in-house counsel
claims, yet in each case the court deflects the overriding issue of attorney ethics.
Instead these cases rely on Title VII's burden of proof structure to resolve what could
be characterized as a generic workplace conflict. The courts focus their analysis on
the presence or absence of pretext under the instant facts, thus passing over the initial
question whether an attorney who files a claim can establish a prima facie case of
retaliation in light of the conflicting provisions of the Model Rules. Resolution of
these cases therefore turns on an evaluation of the facts supporting termination, as in
any other case involving an employee suing her employer, rather than on the
availability of a defense based on the attorney's violation of her ethical obligations.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 831.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. In so doing, the court rejected the defendants' assertion that permitting termination
based solely on the filing of the claim might be appropriate in the "unique" facts before it. Id.
at 832. Although the court does not explain its meaning, it bears noting that the word "unique"
has become almost a term of art in characterizing the attorney-client relationship and is
invariably invoked injustifying the special obligations with which attorneys have traditionally
been saddled. See, e.g., Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (citing attorney's unique position in society and special relationship with
client in support of decision to deny in-house counsel's wrongful discharge claim).
99. See Verney, 903 F. Supp. at 833.
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B. Rules Exalted: Ethical Rule Violation
As a Bar to Statutory Protection
The analysis in Jones and Verney stands in sharp contrast to the treatment of
protected conduct exhibited in a recent post-termination decision by the Fifth Circuit,
the same court that heard Jones. In Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations
Co., the court broadly announced that conduct violative of the professional duties of
loyalty:and confidentiality is not protected by Title VII in the context of a retaliation
suit by an in-house attorney."°° There the plaintiff-attorney was employed by a private
company that oversaw the Department of Energy's ("DOE") petroleum reserve
facilities.'"I At a meeting with DOE auditors, the plaintiffwas asked whether she was
aware of any equal pay claims by female employees." ° She responded that she was
not, but that "maybe [she would] get [her] money now," and offered her opinion that
the employment law compliance situation at her company was a "class action waiting
to happen."' 3 Following the meeting, the plaintiff received a written performance
evaluation in which she was criticized for exercising poor judgment during the
auditors meeting."° The plaintiff forwarded a written response to the general counsel,
a DOE whistle blower officer, and several other employees. 05 In the letter, she
complained that she had been subjected to race and sex discrimination and discussed
the discrimination complaint of another employee and a transaction the plaintiff had
handled for the company."° When the employer learned about the response, it
terminated her.0"
Reviewing the plaintiff's subsequent retaliation claim, the Fifth Circuit held that
the plaintiff's conduct constituted a breach of her duties ofconfidentialiiy and loyalty
and was consequently unprotected as a matter of law.' Analyzing the conduct first
under the applicable state professional rules, the court determined that the information
contained in the response letter concerning the employee and the transaction
constituted confidential information gained during the representation not subject to
any of the exceptions that permit disclosure."° In so concluding, the court summarily
dismissed the plaintiff's argument that the disclosure fit within the exception for
establishing a claim in a dispute between the lawyer and the client."0 Turning to the
100. 144 F.3d 364, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1998).
101. See id. at 366.
102. See id
103. Id at 366-67.




108. See id at 369.
109. See id at 369-72.
110. The court's disregard of that exception was based not on an analysis of the applicability
of the exception to discrimination claims, but on its determination that the subject matter of
the response letter did not constitute a controversy between the plaintiff and the client. See id.
at 372. This conclusion was itself based on the largely irrelevant fact that, in response to a
phone call from the DOE whistle blower officer, the plaintiff told the officer that her response
letter was not a whistle blower complaint. See id.
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federal statute, the court properly addressed itself to the initial question whether the
plaintiff's conduct was protected in light of her professional obligations. However,
it sought to resolve that issue through an unusual and seeming misapplication of the
test designed to exclude excessively disruptive and unreasonable conduct from
statutory protection. The court did not balance the manner in which the plaintiff
registered her protest and the tangible effects of the conduct, or in this case the
alleged rule violation, on the employer's ability to conduct its business. Though it
recited the principle that courts must look to the effect of the oppositional conduct on
the plaintiff's ability to perform,"' the court did not consider any factual evidence
relating the plaintiff's job performance or the employer's belief that she was
ineffective in her position. Rather, it weighed and compared two abstract principles:
the expectation of the employer that in-house counsel will abide by the rules of
professional ethics, and the attorney's right to oppose allegedly discriminatory
practices. "2 Citing the in-house attorney's "unique position of special trust" and the
client's "concomitant position of vulnerability," as well as the interests of the legal
profession in maintaining the integrity and reputation of its officers, the court
concluded that the interests of employers and the profession must prevail over
attorneys' individual rights.I" Thus, the court broadly announced that conduct that
breaches the ethical duties of the legal profession is unprotected as a matter of law
and that an attorney who violates those duties is not entitled to any damages flowing
from retaliation taken by her employer-client." 4
Unlike the holdings of Jones and Verney, the Douglas decision uses the ethical
rules as the touchstone for analyzing attorney claims and makes rule compliance the
prerequisite to statutory protection. While Douglas involves a post-termination
lawsuit, and more closely implicates the duty of confidentiality than the duty of
loyalty, its method of analysis would apply equally to the problem posed by a pre-
termination lawsuit as in Jones and Verney. It is clear that Douglas's conduct was in
protest ofwhat she perceived as discriminatory treatment directed both toward herself
and to other employees. Although the court pays lip service to the idea that Douglas's
conduct rendered her ineffective in her position, like Jones, it provides no factual
support for that contention. It focuses throughout the opinion on ethical principles,
not job performance. The court compares the rights of an employee and the
obligations of an attorney and, in dualistic terms, concludes that the latter trumps the
former. Individual rights and the plaintiff's expectations as an employee are sacrificed
11. See id. at 374-75.
112. See id. at 375-76.
113. Id. at 375.
114. See id at 376-77; see also Sokolow v. City of League City, 37 F. Supp. 2d 940, 945
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (declining to determine whether city attorney's conduct in drafting memo
condemning racially offensive comments was protected conduct but noting that "a real or
perceived violation of an ethical duty, even when that violation pertains to Title VII, can.
provide a legitimate basis for termination" in granting summaryjudgmentto defendant-client);
cf Hull v. Celanese Corp., 375 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (denying motion by
corporate attorney to intervene as plaintiff in discrimination suit brought against her employer
where attorney's prior work on defense of same matter created risk of disclosure of
confidential information in violation of ethical canons).
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explicitly' 5 to the ideals of the legal profession and what the court perceives as the
needs of the client within the context of an attorney-client relationship.
III. FROM A CLASH OF IDEALS TOWARD
CONCOMITANT OBLIGATIONS
The failure of the existing case law to yield any common framework for resolving
these issues, and the courts' reluctance to confront the implicit problem, betrays
deeper tensions in the status and perception of in-house counsel and attorneys
generally. Whereas the problem of discrimination against in-house counsel may be
viewed from the perspective of two discrete areas of substantive law, neither can
adequately account for the legitimate competing interests at stake in such a conflict.
Indeed, the difficulty of crafting this problem as an issue pertaining to either legal
regime is itself revealing insofar as it points to a fundamental shortcoming in our
conception of professional ethics: The duties of an attorney are imposed and
interpreted wholly apart from any acknowledgment of individual rights in the context
ofthe attorney-client relationship. The following subpart takes issue with the dualistic
approach to the attorney-employee distinction exhibited in the current case law and
criticizes the current construction of attorney ethics that entirely disregards lawyers'
legitimate self-interests. The subpart then offers several justifications for affording
in-house attorneys the ethical latitude to redress workplace discrimination without
fear of reprisal, taking into consideration the theoretical underpinnings of the concept
of absolute loyalty and the realistic circumstances under which corporate attorneys
practice.
A. A Conflict ofAbsolutes
The existing case law involving attorneys engaged in otherwise protected conduct
suggests that the possible means of addressing in-house counsel rights in this context
are twofold and mutually exclusive: Under one approach, corporate counsel is treated
purely as an attorney, so that the ethical rules become the benchmark for what may
be considered the proper exercise of rights under Title VII. Under the other,
professional ethics are wholly ignored, leaving the attorney to be treated as any
employee. These approaches reflect two distinct and equally understandable
absolutes.
On one level, the problem posed by the in-house counsel situation, and by
consequence its resolution, is simple." 6 Removing the cloak of federal rights and
115. See Douglas, 144 F.3d at 376 (asserting that the interests of the profession and the
client "must prevail" over the attorney's individual rights).
116. What appears to be a simple question of applicable law in the ethics arena often masks
more complicated issues involving the limits of lawyers' professional obligations. Scholarship
has criticized the approach to legal ethics that seeks easy answers to questions of this nature.
See, e.g., Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823,
848 & n.124 (1996) (noting that the ordinariness and recurrence of ethical questions belies
their complexity); Patterson, supra note 47, at 957 (critiquing the quasi-legal status of ethical
rules as permitting a one-dimensional approach to ethical issues that responds to questions in
"black or white terms"); William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Ethical
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viewing the situation purely from the perspective of legal ethics, the question raised
is whether an attorney can sue her own client while maintaining the pre-existing
attorney-client relationship. The answer, obvious from the legacy ofboth the common
law and attempts to codify ethical precepts, is a resounding "no." ' 7 Any other
response not only sanctions attorney conduct that runs against all inherent
assumptions about professional loyalty, but, in the context of this particular scenario,
would arguably compel a client to retain an attorney in whom the client had lost
trust.1" Thus, to the extent the question has been considered, it has generally been
assumed that an attorney subject to discrimination would be obligated to resign if she
wished to pursue a claim." 9
Given the inevitable result under the ethics rules, it is not surprising that courts
might prefer to analyze the problem solely from the perspective of the Title VII
doctrine, for they would otherwise be hamstrung to an approach that denies attorney-
employees basic statutory protections. While the rule-exalting approach utilized in
Douglas has the value of ensuring a uniform level of objective ethical compliance
consistent with generally accepted practices, it effectively exempts in-house counsel
positions from the job protection aspects of Title VII. "I The implication of such a
result would be to force employed attorneys subject to discrimination or harassment
either to suffer in silence or quit to pursue their federal rights, an effect that from the
perspective of employment law stands the purpose of the statute on its head.
Permitting employers to terminate otherwise protected employees based solely on
Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998) (describing the mainstream approach to ethical
decisionmaking as a matter of simplistic judgment).
117. As one court noted, the proposition is so obvious that it has scarcely been recorded in
published case law. See Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d
1142, 1155 (Cal. 1994).
118. The idea that a client might be forced to continue employing an attorney against its will
is particularly offensive to existing principles of legal ethics and common law regarding the
attorney-client relationship. The right of the client to sever the attorney-client relationship at
will is considered "bedrock law." See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d
487, 493 (Cal. 1994); see also Corti v. Fleisher, 417 N.E.2d 764, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
("[E]ach person must have the untrammeled right to the counsel of his choice."); Dwyer v.
Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) ("A client is always entitled to be represented
by counsel of his choosing .... No concept of the practice of law is more deeply rooted.").
119. See Kocher v. Acer Inc., No. C-93-20132 RMW (PVT), 1993 WL 149077, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. May 7, 1993) (noting in review of claim by in-house attorney terminated for threatening
to bring claim for discrimination that plaintiff could not have brought such a claim while
continuing his employment); Moore, supra note 9, at 543; cf. Weaver, supra note 1, at 1050
(favoring internal resolution of in-house counsel discrimination disputes over pursuit of
employment litigation).
120. This Article does not suggest that the rule-exalting approach utilized in Douglas would
preclude an in-house attorney from engaging in any type of protective conduct. An attorney-
employee would presumably be free to voice opposition to questionable practices within the
company through appropriate corporate channels. One might argue that such conduct is
sanctioned, if not required, by the ethical rules, which obligates corporate attorneys to take
measures to ensure that their client upholds the law. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule
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their status as attorneys gives the employer a license to discriminate and does serious
injustice to the rights of the individual victim.
For these reasons, the applicability of the ethical rules to an in-house attorney in
conflict with her employer in this context cannot be considered apart from the
individual rights of attorney-employees. Given the current understanding of the
doctrine of legal ethics, the assumption that the ethical rules establish a bar to certain
protected behavior presents an insurmountable hurdle to enforcing pre-termination
rights. Yet an approach that considers solely Title VII fails to accommodate
legitimate client concerns regarding the fidelity of counsel and potentiallyjeopardizes
the professional status of in-house employees.12 ' The existing case law thus reveals
a need for an approach that reaches outside the attorney-employee dichotomy and
attempts a genuine and integrated consideration of the competing rights and interests
that attach to what are currently seen as divisible roles.
B. Role Confusion, Loss of Self, and the Complications
of a Commercialized Profession
The chief obstacle to a more considered approach to the in-house counsel
discrimination problem is the accepted concept of professional loyalty that supposes
total abdication by the attorney of all "adverse" interests without any consideration
of the nature of the interests involved or their effect on the professional relationship.
While imposing these duties on the attorney, the law of ethics fails to recognize any
concomitant obligations on the part of the client or consider the extent to which the
conduct of the client creates the conflict at issue. While problematic on several levels,
this model of attorney-client responsibility is particularly ill-equipped to respond to
discrimination against employed counsel. Given the nature of the in-house counsel
relationship and the source of conflict generated by workplace discrimination, a more
balanced and context-based definition of loyalty and conflict is appropriate.
1. Deconstructing Loyalty: Images and Realities
of the Attorney-Client Relationship
The underlying image of the attorney on which modem ethical precepts are based
is that of an "undivided partisan" who owes total allegiance to the client.' The
121. A chief argument against permitting suits by in-house attorneys in other contexts, often
championed by in-house attorneys themselves, has been the concern that allowing suits by in-
house counsel will result in a two-tiered profession in which in-house counsel are subject to
lesser standards of professional behavior. See Board of Directors of the American Corporate
Counsel Association Policy Statement on Wrongful Discharge Suits Filed by In-House
Counsel (adopted Nov. 6, 1991). This Author believes that such concerns, while not
unfounded, should not be viewed as an absolute obstacle to recognition of in-house counsel's
employment rights, particularly in light of the increased status of in-house counsel within the
profession. See Sally R. Weaver, Client Confidences in Disputes Between In-House Attorneys
and Their Employer-Clients: Much Ado About Nothing-Or Something?, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 483, 536 (finding concerns about differential treatment of in-house attorneys
"overstated"); infra note 141; discussion infra Part III.B.2.
122. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv. 589,
INDIANA LAW JOURNTAL
attorney is depicted as a zealous advocate engaged in an adversarial process on behalf
of a vulnerable individual who has placed absolute trust and confidence in the
attorney to safeguard his or her ,interests. The attorney must do everything within
legal bounds to advance the client's ends without allowing her personal sense of
justice or the interests of third parties to diminish the efficacy of her representation.
The origins of this imagery are owed largely to general concepts of professionalism
and the belief that the lawyer-client relationship is unique among professional
relationships. By its nature, the idea of a profession connotes service to another, and
it is therefore assumed that the pursuit of a profession entails some degree of self-
sacrifice on behalf ofthose one serves.2Z With respect to the legal profession, lawyers
have specialized knowledge and training to which the average client does not have
access but which the client needs in order to advance or defend against a claim.
Because the lawyer's services in this respect are esoteric and technical in nature, the
client is presumably not able to evaluate the quality of the service provided in relation
to the client's need. 24 The client's ability to obtain effective representation, however,
is crucial to his or her ability to exercise the rights and protections afforded by the
legal system to their fullest extent and thus to gain full autonomy within society.'25
For all of these reasons, the client is placed in a position of significant dependence
vis-A-vis the attorney, who is the sole source of a service that is both essential and
inscrutable to the person who will be affected by it.
Given this significant power imbalance, the obligation of professional loyalty
serves as a safeguard that will ideally prevent abuse of power and ensure that the
client's interests are advanced to their fullest." 6 Under the prevailing view, the duty
of loyalty requires the attorney to devote herself fully to the client on several levels:
She must refuse to accept any employment that would place her in a position adverse
to her client and, further, she is obligated to set aside her personal interests to the
extent they might interfere with her ability to act on the client's behalf. The latter
aspect of the obligation evokes the related requirement of professional neutrality. In
addition to assuming an undivided commitment to advancing the client's cause or
position, the attorney is expected to set aside her own view of the legitimacy of the
client's aims, thus ensuring that clients will not be denied access to legal services, and
consequently the ability to exercise rights, based on the predilections of attorneys. 27
Together these professional obligations personalize the attorney-client relationship
from the perspective of the client while depersonalizing it from the perspective of the
594 (1985).
123. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615.
124. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 889 (1990) (identifying informational asymmetry between
lawyer and client as the distinctive characteristic of the market for legal services).
125. See Pepper, supra note 123, at 616-17.
126. See id. at 616. That is not to say that technical compliance with the governing rules can
in itself ensure ethical behavior, and the Model Rules themselves contemplate that lawyers will
be guided by personal conscience in delivering legal services. See MODEL RULES, supra note
10, Scope ("The Rules do not.., exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.").
127. See Pepper, supra note 123, at 616-17.
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attorney. By requiring the attorney to forgo conflicting professional interests, the
concept of loyalty aligns the attorney's own interests with those of her client; the
lawyer is not a hired gun who will advocate for whatever position she is paid to
support, but is a personal agent of the client who is invested financially and
emotionally in the success of representation. At the same time, by requiring the
attorney to set aside personal preconceptions, the obligation of neutrality ensures that
the lawyer pursues the representation with the mind-set of a detached professional;
it forces the attorney to remove herself from the service she provides.12
Thus the model of the attorney-client relationship that underlies the construct of
attorney loyalty is one that involves abdication of self in order to enhance client
autonomy. Considered in this light, an effort by an in-house attorney not only to
identify but also to redress what she considers wrongdoing on the part of the client
runs entirely counter to the values underlying the legal ethics rules.
A significant problem with the existing model, however, is that in its attempt to
rectify a perceived imbalance of power and ensure client access to quality
representation, it fails to recognize any concomitant responsibilities on the part of the
client in delineating the limits of the attorney's obligations.'29 Of course, certain
constraints govern the type of representation a client may obtain: An attorney is
prohibited from assisting a client in the commission of a crime or fraud both by the
ethical rules and applicable law, 3 ' and an attorney is always free at the outset to
refuse to accept a client for any reason.' However, the client's only affirmative duty
to the attorney during the course of representation is to fulfill the financial obligations
128. The idealization of attorney neutrality has been fodder for the increasingly vocal
critique that lawyers wrongfully escape all moral responsibility for the aims and ends of those
they represent. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence ofCorporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 510 (1994) (noting that the combined principles of
loyalty and neutrality permit lawyers to go to extremes on behalf of their clients and grant
lawyers the authority to set the only limits on those extremes). Along with the growing public
demand for greater accountability in the legal profession, scholars have called for approaches
to legal ethics that allow for and encourage lawyers to think critically and independently about
the work in which they engage. See id.; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JusTIcE 138-69
(1998) (arguing for a contextual approach to legal ethics whereby lawyers may take the actions
most likely to promote justice under the particular circumstances of a given case); Myers,
supra note 116, at 855-58.
129. See David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons
from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 886 (1998) ("Rather than serving as
a mechanism for protecting vulnerable clients from overreaching by their lawyers, the agency
model facilitates a situation in which savvy clients make extraordinary and potentially
illegitimate demands on their lawyers without ever having to justify these demands in terms
of anything other than their self-interest.").
130. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.2(d).
131. See id. Scope (noting that "[m]ost of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer
relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and
the lawyer has agreed to do so"). Of course, the attorney's prerogative not to represent a plient
is sharply constrained once representation has begun. See id. Rule 1.16(b) (delineating
circumstances under which a lawyer is permitted to withdraw from representing a client if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests);
supra Part I.B.1.
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of the parties' contract, namely to pay for services rendered.' There are no
reciprocal responsibilities to the fiduciary obligations assumed by the attorney, nor
even any expectation or requirement that the client will act in good faith.
This system allows the client to exact a complete investment by the attorney
without incurring any responsibility for the attorney's well-being or ability to perform
within the relationship. Setting aside the question whether such a model is proper
under any justification, it seems particularly suspect given its theoretical
underpinnings and the realities of modem legal practice. Whereas the model
contemplates clients unable to access or evaluate the legal services they require, in
actuality modem law firms compete vigorously to market themselves and elicit
business from an increasingly discriminating base of high-powered corporate
clients.'34 It is now routine, for instance, for large law firms to engage in advertising
schemes to solicit business, for clients to request and review proposed budgets and
strategies in selecting counsel for complex work, and for law firms to reduce their
normal rates or enter into a variety of concessions to appease and obtain valuable
clients. 35 Once counsel is retained, clients exercise a significant degree of control
over the day-to-day work that lawyers do, participating in strategic decisionmaking
and evaluating carefully the costs involved in what might traditionally have been
considered lawyers' choices. 6
132. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 29 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1992).
133. In comparison, agency law generally contemplates that the principal assumes a duty to
act in good faith vis-A-vis the agent and not to interfere with agent's ability to serve. See
Wilkins, supra note 129, at 881 (comparing obligations of client toward attorney with
obligations owed by principal to agent); see also HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THELAWOF AGENCYAND PARTNERSHIP §§ 83,85 (2d ed. 1990). Indeed since these
obligations are generally implied as contractual provisions within an agency relationship, it
might be said that the client's duties to the attorney are less than contemplated by contract
while the attorney's duties include extracontractual obligations.
134. This statement and the discussion that follows focus specifically on corporate clients,
since it is these clients who will be affected by a recognition of in-house counsel's ability to
exercise rights under Title VII. It should be noted that many of the changes with respect to
corporate clients' ability to manage and control their relationships with counsel are the result
of the developing presence of in-house legal departments whose members have the knowledge
necessary to reduce informational asymmetry. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 293-99
(describing effect of reliance on in-house counsel on relationships between corporate clients
and elite law firms); Rosen, supra note 2, at 481-90; infra Part III.B.2.
135. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes
in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
621, 630-31 (1994) (noting "fierce competition" among law firms for the acquisition and
retention of clients and the frequent use of seminars and other low-key forms of advertising
to attract business); Wilkins, supra note 129, at 884 (noting that corporations now routinely
shop for lawyers by holding "beauty contests" in which firms compete for important work).
136. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 485 (noting that outside law firms frequently "cede strategic
control" to in-house legal departments); Wilkins, supra note 129, at 887 (noting that corporate
clients now exercise significant control over every facet of law firms' internal operations by
approving staffing choices, reviewing documents, requiring detailed bills, and making
substantive legal decisions). In this way, corporate clients are blurring the distinction between
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Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, most clients no longer rely on a single
attorney or law firm to service all of their legal needs. While corporations once found
it efficient to invest in long-term relationships with individual law firms, it is now
common for corporate clients to strategically chose counsel for discrete needs, based
on practice specialties, costs, and other pragmatic factors.' Thus, while the existence
of an absolute attorney loyalty obligation enables clients to demand a personal
commitment from those whom they view as "their" lawyers, fewer and fewer
corporate clients maintain any degree of loyalty, in the common sense of the word,
to the attorneys they choose."'
In all of these ways, the power imbalance that arguably characterizes the attorney-
client relationship has become distorted by the increased commercialization of
modem legal practice and the growing sophistication of those entities seeking legal
services. 3 9 In such an environment it is reasonable to ask whether the model of
unilateral loyalty in which the attorney must completely set aside all interests deemed
adverse to the client is actually necessary to ensure quality performance, or more
importantly whether it is proper in a situation involving conflict between the lawyer
and the client. If the attorney is bound to a duty of absolute loyalty to the client that
trumps even her personal interests, should not the client bear some responsibility in
protecting those interests over which it exercises significant control?
2. Characterizing In-House Counsel: Specialized
Professional or Business Employee?
These questions resonate all the more powerfully in the in-house counsel context,
where the attorney-client relationship is complicated, not only by the sophistication
of the client and general trends in corporate legal practice, but by the overlay of
additional duties and responsibilities attendant to an employment relationship. For
decisions about the aims and purposes of legal representation, which have always been
considered the prerogative of the client, and the means by which those ends are accomplished,
which has traditionally fallen within the discretion of the attorney. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 10, Rule 1.2 cmt. ("Scope of Representation").
137. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 294 n.50 (noting that according to a 1980s study
only 10% of large companies spent more than half their outside counsel fees with one firm)
(citing ARTHUR YOUNG SURVEY, supra note 1); Rosen, supra note 2, at 489 (observing that
the emerging pattern of law firm retention is a movement "away from bilateral monopolies
toward a competitive market in which alternative suppliers are plentiful and may be hired
either on a spot contract or an employment basis"). In addition, the selective reliance on
individual attorneys with expertise in particular areas is replacing retention of firms that
formerly served as full-service general counsel to corporate clients. See Liggio, supra note 2,
at 1210.
138. Indeed clients may even take advantage of the ethical regime designed to protect them
by parceling out their work to a large number of firms so as to later invoke the categorical
prohibition against those law firms bringing suit against them. See Thomas D. Morgan, Suing
a Current Client, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 1157, 1162 (1996).
139. See Wilkins, supra note 129, at 882 (noting that the agency model that defines lawyer-
client relationships is "premised on a set of interconnecting factual assumptions about client
vulnerability... [that] fail to capture the complex power relationship between contemporary
corporate clients and their outside counsel").
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purposes of accounting for the context in which workplace discrimination problems
arise, the in-house attorney-corporate client relationship may be characterized by a
decrease in the control normally associated with the role and position of the attorney
and, at the same time, by an increase in the assumption of responsibilities not
traditionally associated with lawyer's work. 4 ' In this way, the in-house attorney
assumes what can be considered the burdens of employment, so that entitlement to
the benefits of that status seems appropriate. 4 '
Unlike their law fim counterparts, in-house counsel are particularly vulnerable in
the event of a disruption of their employment relationship. In-house attorneys have
no ability to hedge against a potential loss of income by developing a diversified
client base, but instead owe their livelihood and professional futures to a single client-
employer. 42 At the same time, in-house counsel are subject, like other employees, to
the pay scales, personnel policies, and other workplace constraints imposed
unilaterally by their client-employer. In this way, in-house counsel's economic
dependence on the corporate client more closely approximates the relationship that
exists between other upper-level employees and their employer than that which exists
between a client and its outside counsel.143 To whatever extent the sacrifice-or-
140. Much has been written about the nature of in-house practice and its development in the
last several decades. For a discussion of the nature of in-house practice, the historical role of
in-house counsel, and recent trends in the development of corporate legal departments, see
SALLY GuNz, THE NEW CORPORATE COUNSEL (1992); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 279-
93; Liggio, supra note 2, at 1201-22; Rosen, supra note 2, at 503-25.
141. Recognition of the differences in the responsibilities of in-house attorneys versus
outside lawyers necessarily generates concern over the professional status of in-house
attorneys. Resistance to this approach has chiefly argued that creating what might be deemed
exceptions to the ethics rules will lead to a regime in which in-house counsel are considered
second-rate professionals in relation to their elite law firm counterparts. See Rhode, supra note
122. Such fears are based largely on historical ideas about what types of attorneys traditionally
entered in-house positions and the type ofworkthey performed, concepts which are now being
supplanted by a surge in the visibility and professional power of in-house attorneys. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMoRY L.J. 1011, 1012
(1997) (noting that the "second-class citizenship" previously assigned to in-house attorneys
has now ceased as a result of changes in corporate clients' reliance on in-house legal
departments and changes in legal practice generally); see also supra note 2. As these trends in
corporate legal practices continue, it becomes increasingly unsound as well as unnecessary to
refuse to recognize legitimate differences in the nature of in-house lawyers' work and
responsibilities that will affect the moral calculus under which these lawyers operate.
142. As the California Supreme Court explained in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior
Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491 (Cal. 1994):
Unlike the law firm partner, who typically possesses a significant measure of
economic independence... derived from a multiple client base, the economic
fate of in-house attorneys is tied directly to a single employer.... [F]rom an
economic standpoint, the dependence of in-house counsel is indistinguishable
from that of other corporate managers or senior executives who also owe their
livelihoods and career goals and satisfaction to a single organizational employer.
Id.
143. It should be noted that the in-house attorney who finds herself in a dispute with her
employer stands not only to lose her job, she risks the possibility of being professionally
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withdraw regime may be justified in other contexts, the idea that the attorney
possesses significantly greater bargaining power than her client is certainly inapposite
here."M
The issue is not merely one of financial dependence, however, but also one of
parity of treatment vis-A-vis other upper level employees. In-house counsel are
expected to be immersed in the corporation that they serve; they share and participate
in its risks, successes, projections, and goals. 4 ' This integration is reflected in the
work that in-house lawyers do. Companies do not retain in-house counsel solely as
substitutes for outside counsel, but as members ofthe "team" responsible for running
the business.'46 In addition to the usual work relating to the management of specific
legal matters, in-house counsel participate frequently in long and short term strategic
planning and almost always are responsible for prevention and compliance
programming and the supervision of outside counsel. 47 With respect to their
corporate planning finctions, in-house counsel's role goes beyond legal risk analysis
to consultation and participation in the executive decisionmaking process through
membership on planning committees and senior management councils, and through
informal contact with chief officers and financial personnel. 4 In-house counsel are
viewed as contributing specialized knowledge of the business as well as legal
expertise.'49 In this way they perform as executives invested with significant
responsibility for the success and direction of the company.
With respect to their oversight and compliance responsibilities, in-house counsel
act much like managers of both the internal and external resources of the company.
As lawyers practicing preventative law, in-house counsel are charged with the
education of operating personnel whose duties determine corporate compliance:
Counsel must disseminate information about applicable law, identify risky business
practices and propose changes, respond appropriately to company violations, and
monitor employee behavior for continued compliance.' As the employees primarily
blacklisted in the corporate-legal community in the event that her termination occurs on bad
terms. See Hazard, Jr., supra note 141, at 1015.
144. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 492-93 (comparing economic dependence of in-house and
outside counsel).
145. See Liggio, supra note 2, at 1206 (describing such attorneys as the "new breed" of
corporate counsel); Howard B. Miller, Law Risk Management and the General Counsel, 46
EMORY L.J. 1223, 1223 (1997) (describing general counsel as combined risk analyzers and
information managers).
146. See Brotman & Ogden, supra note 6, at 34; Hazard, Jr., supra note 141, at 1017; see
also Rosen, supra note 2, at 526-27 (describing in-house counsel as "'institutional personnel'
empowered by their corporations to be involved in formulating, influencing and implementing
corporate goals and commitments").
147. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 280-93 (describing typical functions of in-house
lawyers beyond assumption of work otherwise performed by outside counsel); see also Rosen,
supra note 2, at 504, 510-24.
148. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 282-83 (describing trend toward formal
integration of in-house counsel into corporate planning process).
149. See Brotman & Ogden, supra note 6, at 34-35; Daly, supra note 1, at 1060-61.
150. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, 284-87 (describing role of in-house attorney in
developing programmatic prevention plans). See generally Richard S. Gruner, General
Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J.
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responsible for retained outside counsel, in-house counsel create and oversee the
company's contracts for external legal services. Their responsibilities may include
identification of work to be assigned externally, selection of appropriate outside
counsel, negotiation and review of fees, bills, and projected budgets, participation in
strategic decisions related to outside legal matters, and performance oversight. 5' In-
house counsel effectively manage the company's internal legal compliance and its use
of external legal services as other divisions manage cash resources and product
quality.15
2
Thus, the role that in-house counsel assumes on behalf of the client is larger in
several respects than that of an outside attorney. 3 This expanded image of in-house
counsel should have significant implications on the standard for ethical compliance
in the face of a challenge to individual rights. To the extent the work performed by
in-house lawyers resembles and even overlaps with the work of other managers and
executives, who are unquestionably within the reach of Title VII, it is reasonable to
treat in-house lawyers comparably, All employees, including upper level managers
and executives, are entitled to exercise Title VII rights, including the right to bring
suit while employed, without fear of retaliation. Such suits obviously may strain the
relationship between employer and employee and indeed, in the case of upper-level
employees, may be perceived by the employer as a breach of loyalty. However, such
suits have nonetheless been deemed protected unless or until they have a tangible
effect on performance that constitutes anonpretextual basis for termination. Allowing
the concept of "loyalty" to preclude a claim when grounded in ethical principles
appears no more legitimate than an equivalent sanction based on employer sentiment,
which is clearly in the teeth of the statutory prohibition.
More importantly, the expanded role of in-house counsel and the integration of the
position within the company itself calls for an increased investment on the part of the
individual attorney that rightfully requires a concomitant increase in client
responsibility. The acceptance of an in-house counsel position entails various
sacrifices, including the loss of financial security and professional autonomy that
come with the ability to maintain an independent practice. It is the client who reaps
the benefits of these sacrifices in terms of its consistent access to the legal advice and
other resources provided by the in-house attorney at a fixed cost and the increased
quality of services obtained resulting from the attorney's commitment to and
integration within the company. Given that the client gains the benefit of having a
1113,1141-63 (1997) (discussing role of general counsel incorporate compliance generally).
151. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 289-93.
152. See Gruner, supra note 150, at 1152; see also Rosen, supra note 2, at 524 (noting that
in-house lawyers practicing preventative law act as managers drawing on various resources
made available to them).
153. Of course outside law firms frequently take on work for corporate clients that relates
to business planning, compliance, and preventative programming in addition to traditional
work involving the resolution of particular legal matters. However, the work of outside firms
is necessarily less customized than that of in-house counsel and does not require the lawyer's
complete personal investment in the success of the company. Because of the nature of the in-
house counsel's work and her proximity to the client, companies are likely to expect a greater
degree of loyalty and commitment from in-house attorneys than from outside firms. See
Wilkins, supra note 129, at 886-87.
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multi-faceted employee over an outside attorney, it is logical to expect the client to
assume the resulting burden associated with the attorney's change in status, that is,
a full commitment to compliance with the applicable employment laws.
C. Justifying and Limiting the Application of
a Modified Ethical Calculus
For all of these reasons, an implicit acceptance of the idea that ethical constraints
preclude employed in-house counsel from exercising the full extent of their rights as
employees is unsuited to the contextual reality in which discrimination claims arise.
A modified ethical regime, based on the concept of shared responsibility between the
in-house attorney and the corporate client, is therefore appropriate.
The necessary limits of such an approach, however, should here be identified in
anticipation of legitimate objections to altering the existing balance ofresponsibilities
in which the lawyer's ethical duties are considered absolute. Recognition of the
attorney's right to the full protection of Title VII does not open the floodgates to a
regime in which the external personal interests of lawyers are perceived as equivalent
or superior to the needs of clients. The basis for adopting a modification in the
discrimination context lies in the nature of the in-house attorney's interest as one
rooted in the employment relationship and for which the client is responsible.5 4 Nor
does granting the attorney the benefit of the law imply that in-house attorneys subject
to discrimination will in all cases pursue litigation against their corporate employers
while employed, a situation that would admittedly create severe difficulties for both
parties. While simultaneous litigation may result in some circumstances, 5 ' the
purpose of recalibrating the ethical scheme is to enable attorneys to respond to
discrimination effectively. By recognizing the in-house attorney's entitlement to job
protection and creating a means by which she can seek redress in court, the law
assures in-house counsel the leverage she needs to bring internal complaints through
the proper channels, insist that responsive action is taken, and, if necessary, negotiate
favorable terms of severance in resolution of these types of disputes. 6
In this way, the argument in favor of modifying the governing ethical precepts is
fundamentally about encouraging compliance with the discrimination laws. The rigid
enforcement of ethical rules in the in-house counsel context allows corporations to
discriminate with relative impunity5 7 where the employee in question is an attorney.
By removing the employer's ability to escape liability by relying on the attorney's
special status, the new regime would force employers to behave proactively in
154. This distinguishes the "adverse" interest at stake in this problem from competing
financial interests or business pursuits of the attorney.
155. See infra Part III.B. (discussing the extent to which the rules of professional ethics
would constrain in-house counsel in pursuing such a suit).
156. See Weaver, supra note 1, at 1050 (favoring internal resolution of in-house counsel
discrimination disputes).
157. In the absence of any protection from retaliation, in-house counsel would be
discouraged from engaging in protected conduct. However, in-house counsel would be
permitted to pursue a claim provided she resigned or had been terminated by the client. See
supra note 19.
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preventing and responding to discrimination complaints in order to avoid lengthy and
potentially disruptive legal battles with its employed counsel.
IV. STRIKING A DOCTRINAL BALANCE
Having identified the need for an alternative approach to professional ethics in the
context of discrimination suits by in-house counsel, the question remains how to
strike an appropriate balance between the interests of the attorney and the client in
light of existing law. The following subpart examines two judicial attempts to resolve
disputes between in-house attorneys and their employers arising in analogous areas
of law. Building on these efforts, the subpart then offers a reinterpretation of the
relevant ethical rules that would permit an in-house attorney in certain circumstances
to fully exercise her Title VII rights, while at the same time recognizing and
accommodating concerns regarding the diligence and trustworthiness of in-house
counsel from the perspective of the employer.
A. The Quest for an
Integrated Approach
While courts and commentators have begun to consider greater role-based
distinctions in delineating the ethical obligations of in-house counsel,'58 a consistent
framework for application remains elusive.159 The challenge, particularly in the
context of discrimination against in-house counsel, lies in balancing not only the
diverse professional obligations of the attorney with the needs and demands of the
client, but also in determining how to incorporate the individual rights and personal
entitlements of the person employed as the attorney. Two areas in which ethical
conflicts have arisen between in-house counsel and their client-employers and in
158. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 491-92 (Cal. 1994)
(explaining functional differences between in-house and outside counsel in recognizing in-
house attorney's right to sue for common law wrongful discharge); see also infra Parts III.A. 1,
III.A.2. See generally Schneyer, supra note 1, at 454-57 (describing development of "role
morality" as means of approaching ethical questions).
159. The absence of ethical rules or standards to guide lawyers in a wide array of modem
situational conflicts arising as a result of the increasingly diversified role of the attorney has
been criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences ofthe Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETmICS 631, 635-38 (1997) (critiquing absence of ethical rules to govern lawyers engaged as
mediators or third-party neutrals). See generallyDavid A. Kessler, ProfessionalAsphyxiation:
Why the Legal Profession Is Gasping for Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 455, 457 (1997)
(noting the "distinct lack of an inherent moral framework within current ethical codes and
rules"). With respect to in-house counsel, while there are a growing number of reported cases
addressing in-house attorney employment disputes, these decisions tend to reach fact-specific
results which, while useful in providing underlying support for a modified ethical regime, fail
to offer a consistent doctrinal approach that may easily be imported to the discrimination
context. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-05; Santa Clara County Council Attorneys
Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142, 1154-55 (Cal. 1994); infra Part IV.A.1-2.
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which varying degrees of ethical accommodations have been made to benefit in-
house counsel serve as useful illustrations of this development.
1. Balancing the Interests of Society:
Common Law Retaliatory Discharge Claims
One area which has invited significant judicial and scholarly attention to the issue
of role-based differences in the application of ethical precepts to in-house attorneys
is the problem of common law wrongful discharge claims by terminated corporate
counsel." ° Initially, courts refused to permit terminated counsel to pursue wrongful
discharge claims on grounds that attorneys, unlike regular employees, owe special
fiduciary duties to their client-employers and can be terminated at any time.' Thus,
in Balla v. Gambro, for instance, in which an in-house attorney was fired for
objecting to his client's sale of defective dialyzers, the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that no tort action was warranted because the applicable state ethics rules required the
aggrieved attorney either to report his client's activities or to withdraw from
representation.'62 Citing the "unique" nature of the attorney-client relationship, the
court opined that permitting the tort claim would critically harm the absolute trust and
confidence between lawyer and client, and concluded that public safety was
adequatelyprotectedby the attorney's ethical obligation to disclose the misconduct."
Much like the Fifth Circuit in Douglass v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations
Co., 6 these cases turn to the ethical rules as the exclusive source of law for
regulating conflict between in-house counsel and the client-employer. In so doing,
they place traditional and largely under-explored concepts of professional behavior
above the common law principles applicable to employees, 61 viewing the ideals of
160. Sounding either in tort or contract, wrongful discharge claims generally allege that the
client-employer unlawfully terminated the attorney-employee either for refusing to engage in
unlawful conduct or for reporting unlawful conduct of the client to an outside authority. In the
tort context, these claims are generally articulated within the public policy exception to the at-
will doctrine. See. e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); General Dynamics, 876 P.2d 487; Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991). Contract-based claims are less frequent; they usually
allege that the employment agreement contained an implied understanding that the attorney
would behave lawfully. See, e.g., Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991). See generally Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed
Counsel, I GEo. J. LEGAL ETucs 553 (1988) (summarizing nature of the wrongful discharge
claim and noting distinctions between tort-based and contract-based approaches).
161. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109; Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501
N.E.2d 343, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118.
162. 584 N.E.2d at 110.
163. Id. at 108-09; see also Willy, 647 F. Supp. at 118 (finding that applicability of
mandatory withdrawal regime under ethics rules obviated need for common law protection
under public policy exception); Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346 (citing special position attorneys
occupy in society in failing to extend tort of wrongful discharge to in-house attorneys).
164. 144 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 1998).
165. For the most part these cases merely recite the basic premise that the attorney-client
relationship is one of exceptional trust and confidence. See, e.g., Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
INDIANA LA W JOURNVAL
the profession and the status of employee as seemingly incompatible."6
More recently, other courts have adopted a different and more nuanced approach,
permitting in-house attorneys to sue for wrongful discharge under certain
circumstances. 6 7 In General Dynamics, for instance, the California Supreme Court
recognized many of the differences that distinguish in-house attorneys from their law
firm counterparts, including the long-term relationship between client and in-house
counsel; the larger role assumed by in-house counsel, which encompasses managerial
decisionmaking as well as the provision of standard legal services; and the financial
dependence of in-house counsel on a single client-employer. 6 ' The court at the same
time recognized the need to uphold the ethical principles that safeguard trust and
confidence in the attorney-client relationship. 69 It therefore called for a balanced
approach that would permit an in-house attorney to pursue a wrongful disbharge
claim in situations where confidences could be safeguarded. Thus the court held that
the plaintiff-in-house attorney could proceed with his wrongful discharge claim
provided either that confidential information would not be revealed by his suit or that
any disclosure would fall within the exceptions to the applicable state ethics rules. 70
The articulation of an approach sanctioning in-house counsel wrongful discharge
claims offers a useful starting point for considering discrimination claims given these
decisions' recognition ofthe legitimate differences in the duties of in-house attorneys
versus those of outside counsel and the constraints implicit in the employer-employee
relationship. Indeed, the extension of the right to pursue wrongful discharge claims
offers the individual attorney a powerful means to ensure against the personal and
financial repercussions she might suffer as a result of an ethical conflict. Yet the
recognition of a personal remedy for the attorney in this context is largely fortuitous.
The California opinion and comparable cases evoke a more integrated view of in-
house counsel as both attorney and employee, but ultimately hinge the availability of
the wrongful discharge cause of action on in-house counsel's technical compliance
166. See Reynolds, supra note 160, at 566 (noting that the cases involving wrongful
discharge presume that the lawyer's professional role is incompatible with employee rights
without attempting to locate the lawyer's claim within otherwise applicable common law). The
Balla decision and the handful of cases reaching similar results have spawned a plethora of
critical scholarship. See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 46; Stephen Gillers, Protecting Lawyers Who
Just Say No, 5 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1988); Nancy Kubasek et al., The Social Obligation of
Corporate Counsel: A CommunitarianJustificationforAllowingIn-House Counsel To Sue for
Retaliatory Discharge, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 665 (1998).
167. Most notably the California Supreme Court in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior
Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994). See also GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161
(Mass. 1995); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); cf
Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing
contract-based claim); Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989).
168. 876 P.2d at 491.
169. See id. at 492.
170. See id. at 503-05; see also GTE, 653 N.E.2d at 167 (holding that claim will be
permitted to proceed only if it can be proved without any violation of attorney's obligation to
respect client confidences and secrets); Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502; cf Wieder v. Skala, 609
N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992); Willy v. Coastal States Management Co., 939 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1996).
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with the confidentiality rules.' 7' Thus, courts appear to balance the competing
demands of the profession and the individual attorney, but in reality hold in-house
counsel to the same universal standards imposed throughout the profession.1
7 1
This result follows necessarily from the focus of these decisions, which is not on
accommodating the interests of the plaintiff but on enforcing the attorney's
obligations to society. The tort of wrongful discharge is designed to guard against
violations of recognized public policies.' This goal is accomplished by enabling
employees to report or refuse to participate in their employer's unlawful behavior
without fear of reprisal and by imposing the risk of tort liability on those employers
who engage in conduct that endangers the public. Thus, the purpose of the cause of
action is not to provide a remedy for loss of employment or to safeguard any right to
job security, but rather to protect society by protecting the employee who acts in
society's interest. In the case of in-house counsel, the attorney has a professional duty
to the public, 4 in addition to any personal compunction to act on society's behalf,
and is thus forced to choose between her obligations to her client and her obligation
to third parties. 75 For this reason, courts generally frame the in-house counsel
wrongful discharge problem as a conflict between the zealous advocacy and social
calling aspects of the legal profession.7 6 In this context, the allowance of the cause
of action reflects not a recognition of in-house counsel's right to job protection, but
rather a means of encouraging in-house counsel to abide by their ethical obligations
to the public despite their financial and professional dependance on their corporate
employers.'" For these reasons, the wrongful discharge cases provide useful support
171. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 493.
172. In so doing, the courts largely erode the cause of action that they recognize by placing
the attorney in the impossible position of being able to file a claim without being able to offer
any evidence to support it. See Willy, 939 S.W.2d at 200 (recognizing availability of cause of
action for in-house attorney but finding plaintiff could not proceed because confidential
information would be revealed during suit).
173. See LTNDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 26, at 1016 (noting that "tort cause of action
exists where a discharge is 'against public policy and affects a duty which inures to the benefit
of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee"') (quoting Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988)).
174. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, pmbl. ("A lawyer is... a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality ofjustice."). A lawyer's ethical obligations to the client
thus may be limited by the attorney's competing obligations to third parties and the judicial
system. See id. Rule 1.6(b)(1) (exception to confidentiality rule exists where disclosure is
necessary to prevent client from committing crime or injury to third party); iaL Rule 3.3(b)
(requirement of honesty before tribunal requires disclosure even if information is otherwise
protected by confidentiality rule); see also infra Part I.B.2.
175. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 498 (noting that attorney more than other
employees is likely to face ethical conflicts because lawyer's work is affected with public
interest and concluding that it is precisely because of special ethical obligations of in-house
counsel to act in society's interest that judicial remedy is appropriate).
176. See Giesel, supra note 46, at 562-74.
177. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497-98 (stating that provision of legal remedy to
attorney was not in recognition of right to job protection, but because of societal interests in
preserving health and safety and encouraging law-abiding behavior); see also Giesel, supra
note 46, at 550-57; Gillers, supra note 166, at 5-9; Kubasek et al., supra note 166, at 685-88.
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for role-based analysis of the in-house counsel discrimination problem, but fail to
offer an underlying theoretical approach that recognizes and accounts for attorneys'
competing personal interests. 7
2. The Perception/Performance Distinction:
Santa Clara v. Woodside
In comparison to the common law wrongful discharge scenario, the problem of
discrimination against employed in-house counsel in contravention of Title VII
presents an even greater challenge to the application of ethical rules. Whereas the
conflict in common law wrongful discharge cases implicates the attorney's competing
professional allegiances to the client and the public, the conflict in discrimination
cases arising under Title VII stems from an assertion of individual rights that are
neither sanctioned nor acknowledged in the existing scheme of professional ethics.
In asserting her position, the in-house attorney faced with workplace discrimination
sets her personal interests above and against those of her client, thus violating
fundamental principles of client fidelity.
In this way the discrimination problem is primarily concerned with the ethical duty
of loyalty and the conflict of interest rules. In the common law wrongful discharge
context, the legal battle between the parties necessarily occurs after the attorney-client
(employee-employer) relationship has been severed by the client. Thus, the primary
ethical issue in those disputes involves the revelation of allegedly confidential
information by the attorney in pursuit of her claim. 79 While similar concerns will
arise as a result of the filing of a federal discrimination charge, the more pressing and
ultimately more troubling issues are the immediate strain placed on the relationship
as a result of the in-house attorney's simultaneous pursuit of adverse personal
interests and the limits on the client's autonomy to respond to this perceived violation
of trust by terminating the relationship. Unlike the common law wrongful discharge
context, there appears to be little room, even on a theoretical level, for insistence on
full compliance with existing ethical rules while sanctioning the attorney's pursuit of
her claim.
An approach that seems to account for these distinctions and accept the idea of an
ethical compromise can be found in the treatment of the analogous problem of
178. That is not to say that common law wrongful discharge claims cannot be cast as an
issue of client responsibility for in-house attorney's ability to perform her work freely and
within the bounds of ethics. Cf Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W. 2d 395,400
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that every client-attorney employment contract contains
implied term that attorney will abide by the applicable rules of professional conduct in
recognizing cause of action for attorney's wrongful discharge). However, the existing case law
and scholarship has favored an approach that locates the problem in the tension between the
attorney's responsibilities to the client and society. See supra note 174.
179. The conflict-of-interests rules would, of course, still be relevant to an analysis of the
wrongful discharge problem. Terminated in-house counsel could have a successive conflict-of-
interest problem based on her former representation of the defendant. See MODEL RULEs,
supra note 10, Rule 1.9. However, the existing cases have not raised this issue and the duty of
confidentiality remains the primary concern.
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collective bargaining rights of unionized attorneys.' In Santa Clara, for instance, the
California Supreme Court created a limited exception to the termination at will
principle under state ethics rules for government attorneys seeking to assert collective
bargaining rights while employed.' 8 ' There, a labor organization representing
attorneys in the county counsel's office sought a declaration that its members were
not required to resign from their positions prior to the union's initiation of a suit
against the county employer for failure to bargain in good faith under state law.'8 2
Recognizing the need for a "realistic accommodation" between employed attorneys'
professional obligations and their rights as employees, the court proposed a
"pragmatic approach," in which conformity to ethical precepts would be judged not
on perceived antagonism between lawyer and client, but on whether representation
was actually compromised by the attorneys' activities." 3 The court held that initiation
of litigation while employed does not itself violate ethical precepts,'" provided the
attorney does not "overstepfl ethical boundaries" by failing to represent the client
"faithfully, competently and confidentially."'8 5 Thus, the court concluded that the
state collective bargaining law created an exception to the general rule that a client
may terminate its attorney at will and that the county-employer could not discharge
its attorneys for participating in union activities.'86 At the same time, the court held
that the county should be afforded great flexibility in restructuring its office and
potentially reassigning certain legal matters in order to protect confidential
information pertaining to labor relations issues.8 7
The treatment of collective bargaining rights provides a useful model for
reconciling the ethical rules with the rights conferred by Title VII. Santa Clara
180. See Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n v. Woodside, 869 P.2d 1142 (Cal.
1994); Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1999).
181. 869 P.2d at 1157-58.
182. See id. at 1146. The question whether an attorney is permitted under the rules of ethics
to join a labor organization, while originally subject to some debate, has been answered in the
affirmative by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 986 (1967). See generally
Santa Clara, 869 P.2d at 1155-56. Issues involving attorney collective bargaining rights
generally arise, however, under state law as the applicable federal legislation excludes
supervisory personnel from its definition of covered employees. See id. at 1147-48; see also
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
183. Santa Clara, 869 P.2d at 1157.
184. The court initially determined that the California Rules ofProfessional Conduct, which
are slightly less prohibitive than the Model Rules on this point, did not explicitly prohibit the
attorneys from bringing suit while employed. See id. Whereas the ModelRules's simultaneous
representation rule deals with both personal interests adverse to a current client as well as the
representation of clients with interests adverse to a current client, the California rule refers only
to the representation of other clients. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(b), with
CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3-310(C)(3) (1989).
185. Santa Clara, 869 P.2d at 1157; see also Chiles, 734 So. 2d at 1037; cf Baird v. Cutler,
883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995) (recognizing need for different application of loyalty
principles to employed attorneys in acknowledging attorney's right to bring free speech claims
against city employer).
186. See Santa Clara, 869 P.2d at 635.
187. See id. at 635-36.
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demonstrates both a forthright recognition of the tension implicit in the dual roles of
attorney and employee and a willingness to forge a doctrinal compromise to achieve
an accommodation of employer and attorney interests. The decision does not
completely resolve all aspects of the problem;'88 however, its approach is unique in
its ability to view the individual interests of the attorney-plaintiffs apart from but
simultaneously with their professional obligations. Rather than accept the notion that
pursuit of individual interests necessarily impairs the ability to perform
professionally, which wouldjustify an absolute client right to terminate counsel based
on perceived disloyalty, the court identifies and protects what is ultimately at stake:
the client's ability to insist on the unfettered performance of quality legal work by its
chosen counsel. Thus, the attorney's right to pursue individual rights is sanctioned
unless and until it has an actual adverse effect on the attorney's ability to represent
her client.
B. Revisiting the Rules
The distinction identified in the collective bargaining context between the
perception of disloyalty and the effect of competing interests on performance offers
a potential source of doctrinal compromise in the context of the ethics/Title VII
conflict. The perception/performance distinction argues for a less emphatic response
than that offered by the rule-exalting approach in Douglass in terms of analyzing
ethical behavior. At the same time; recognition of this distinction can do justice to the
needs of the client by identifying situations in which the lawyer's competing personal
interest renders professional loyalty impossible. A proposal for incorporating this
distinction in interpreting the ethics rules follows.
1. From Ethereal Concepts to Actual Conflicts:
Defining Loyalty in the Context of the
Work That In-House Lawyers Do
With respect to the initial question whether an in-house attorney may, within the
bounds of ethics, bring suit while retaining her position as an attorney, a modest
reinterpretation of Model Rule 1.7 is in order.8 9 In the context of a Title VII
discrimination claim by employed counsel, the conflict of interest rule should be read,
not to place a categorical ban on proceedings against the client-employer, but rather
to prohibit suits where an actual conflict affecting the attorney's performance is
188. In particular, the court fails to sufficiently tackle the issue of confidentiality, cursorily
concluding that confidential information would not be implicated by the attorneys' suit. Santa
Clara, 869 P.2d at 1158 n.9.
189. This subpart should not be read to suggest that an in-house attorney should consider
litigation the primary means of responding to employment discrimination. Efforts to reach an
internal resolution of such a dispute would be less disruptive and could be more successful.
However, in the absence of legal recognition of an in-house attorney's right to avail herself of
the full protection of the statute while employed, the attorney's ability to successfully
implement alternative dispute resolution techniques to address her concern% is seriously
compromised. See generally supra Part III.C.
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unavoidable. 1"°
In developing such an analysis, it is first necessary to properly locate the problem
within the framework of the current rule. Specifically, conflicts resulting from
discrimination against in-house counsel should be evaluated, not under part (a) of
Rule 1.7, the "direct adversity" section, but rather under an adjusted reading of part
(b) of the Rule, the "materially limiting" section.' Rule 1.7(a) prohibits an attorney
from "represen[ting] a client if the representation ... will be directly adverse to
another client,"" thus placing a clear prohibition on simultaneous representation of
competing interests in the absence of proper client consent.'93 While the initiation of
a suit by in-house counsel reasonably constitutes litigation against an existing client,
it is not adverse representation as described in Rule 1.7(a) because the attorney brings
the simultaneous suit in her personal capacity rather than as an attorney, that is, she
does not "represent" a competing interest. Treating the potential conflict of interests
as a Rule 1.7(a) problem wrongly conflates in-house counsel's personal and
professional roles.
Rule 1.7(b), on the other hand, explicitly contemplates conflicts stemming from
competing personal interests, as distinct from those resulting from multiple
professional allegiances. Rule 1.7(b) prohibits an attorney from engaging in
representation that may be materially limited by "the lawyer's own interests."' 94 This
portion of the rule, rather than establishing an outright bar, prohibits only those
representations that will be adversely affected by the attorney's outside interests.
Thus the existence of a conflict precluding continued employment by in-house
counsel is not and should not be assumed based solely on the existence of a claim,'
190. The idea of narrowing the scope of Rule 1.7 to permit greater flexibility to practitioners
seeking to represent what would otherwise be considered adverse interests has been proposed
in other contexts, particularly with respect to problems involving corporate subsidiaries. See
Morgan, supra note 138, at 1179-80 (advocating for case-specific approach to determining
existence of impermissible conflict that would take into account whether reasonable client
would perceive breach of loyalty under circumstances and whether there is a credible basis for
believing attorney will be tempted to perform less diligently for one client because of
representation of other).
191. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(a), with id. Rule 1.7(b). It has been
argued in other contexts that the language contained in part (a) of the rule is mere surplusage
on the rule articulated in part (b). See Morgan, supra note 138, at 1182-83.
192. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(a).
193. An assumption of this Article is that a corporate employer would not "consent" to the
in-house attorney's pursuit of her own claim while continuing her representation of the
corporate client.
194. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7(b).
195. The presumption that the filing of a claim alone creates an impermissible conflict
harkens to the appearance of impropriety standard for identifying conflicts set forth in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and abandoned in the Model Rules. See MODEL
CODE, supra note 47, Canon 9 (entitled "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of
Professional Improprieo,"); see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that court may
disqualify attorneys based solely upon Canon 9 prohibition against appearance of inappropriate
representation where impropriety is clear and recognizable as such by reasonable persons).
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but rather should be considered in light of the circumstances giving rise to the claim
and the nature of the attorney's work for the client.
As the comments to Rule 1.7 indicate, the critical question in determining whether
an impermissible conflict exists should be whether the conflict will materially
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering
alternatives on behalf of the client. 'I In the in-house counsel context, the ability to
bring the discrimination claim should depend on whether the work that the in-house
attorney performs for the company is at all related to her claim, so that she might be
tempted to forego possible defenses and strategies on behalf of her client in order to
advantage herself and her legal position. 97 The determination should be fact-based,
taking into account the realities of the attorney's practice as well as her own
perception of the conflict. 98 The automatic assumption that there has been a breach
of loyalty, simply as a result of the filing of a charge and irrespective of its effect on
performance, should not be a basis for subjecting an attorney to discipline if the
attorney made a reasoned determination that she could perform despite her claim.'
From the point of view of ethical compliance then, an attorney should be justified
in filing a claim while employed under these circumstances, despite the absence of
consent.200 However, at common law andunderthe ModelRules, the clientwould still
196. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.7 cmt. 4.
197. Thus, an in-house attorney whose responsibilities included resolution of personnel
matters would not be permitted to bring a claim, while an attorney whose work involved solely
the negotiation of leases, procurement contracts, or other discrete transactional work might be
able to do so.
198. Not every suit by an attorney engaged in matters other than employment issues should
necessarily be considered permissible. If the attorney suspects she will perform her work less
diligently as a result of personal feelings about her employer stemming from her claim, she
would be obligated to resign.
199. Essentially this determination is akin to that which must be made under Rule 1.7(b)(1)
in order to bring an adverse representation outside the scope of the rule. Cf MODEL RULES,
supra note 10, Rule 1.7(b)(1) (requiring that attorney reasonably believe the representation of
existing client will not be impaired by representation of adverse interest). Thus, the difference
between the application of Rule 1.7(b) as contemplated by the Model Rules and that proposed
here is effectively the removal of the requirement of client consent set forth in Rule 1.7(b)(2).
See infra text accompanying note 200.
200. In this way, the proposal locates the ability to identify and judge potential conflicts in
the in-house attorney rather than in the corporate client. Cf MODEL RULES, supra note 10,
Rule 1.7 cmt. 15 (noting that the "[resolution of] questions of conflict of interest is primarily
the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the representation" rather than an issue to be
debated by competing parties in litigation). In general, the Model Rules contemplate that
professional standards will be enforced through self-regulation and, where appropriate, the
disciplinary process; the affirmative, strategic exploitation of perceived violations by clients
is'therefore frowned upon. See id. pmbl. (stating that Model Rules are not intended to form a
basis for civil liability and noting that "the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they
are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons"); see also Hizey v. Carpenter, 830
P.2d 646, 650-51 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting litigant's attempt to introduce breach of
ethical rules as basis for asserting breach of standard of care in proving legal malpractice
claim). But see Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 405
(Tenn. 1991) (recognizing rule violation as providing limited guidance on breach of standard
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be permitted to terminate the attorney irrespective of whether the claim is considered
an ethical breach. The right to select and terminate counsel must not be subjugated
to the attorney's individual rights, but should be constrained to restrict the employer
from violating federal law. In this respect, the existing Title VII doctrine concerning
the limits of protected conduct and the burden of proof structure applicable to
retaliation claims should suffice to prevent retaliation while ensuring that corporate
employers retain the ability to terminate counsel in whom they have legitimately lost
trust. In keeping with the provision, the client-employer should not be permitted to
terminate an in-house attorney who files a claim simply on the basis of her status as
an attorney or on ethereal concepts of client loyalty; such justifications are the
semantic equivalents ofbasing a decision to terminate on the filing of the claim alone,
which is expressly prohibited. However, the employer is and should be free to
terminate counsel for actual disloyalty, either in the form of a rule violation, 20 '
inadequate performance,2 02 unprofessional behavior, 3 or any other nonpretextual
reason.
Thus, both the attorney's obligation to comply with ethical precepts and the right
of the client to terminate counsel at will should be evaluated based on an
understanding of loyalty grounded in the reality, rather than the imagery, of what
attorneys are expected to do. Rather than penalize the individual based on her status
as an attorney, the approach offered here sanctions the pursuit of personal interests,
provided the attorney can reasonably fulfil her role as an attorney with the degree of
competence and dedication that the rules require.
2. Contextualizing the Confidentiality Question:
Rethinking the Scope of Protected Information
Permitting suit under the ethics rules and constraining the employer's right to
terminate counsel does not resolve the conflict posed by in-house counsel's ongoing
duty of confidentiality. Because the Model Rules broadly prohibit an attorney from
revealing any information related to a client, strict application of the ethical rules
of care for legal malpractice claim).
201. This would include a violation of the revised reading of Rule 1.7(b) proposed here, as
where an in-house attorney with responsibility for personnel matters brings suit despite the
objective likelihood that her work will be compromised. This result would be consistent with
certain court decisions regarding Title VII claims by non-attorney employees charged with
personnel responsibilities. See, e.g., Smith v. Singer Co., 650 F.2d 214, 217 (9th Cir. 1981)
(finding defendant's termination of director of industrial relations charged with achieving
federal affirmative action compliance following plaintiff's discrimination complaint did not
constitute unlawful retaliation). Butsee, e.g., Francoeur v. Corroon & Black Co., 552 F. Supp.
403,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding nothing in plaintiff s position as personnel manager or her
behavior in filing charge that would permit employer to lawfully terminate her).
202. In other words, where the in-house attorney's representation of the corporate client is
actually impaired by her pursuit of the discrimination claim. The employer's assertion of
performance-based grounds for termination must be factual in nature and not a mere recital of
perceived inability to perform.
203. As where the in-house attorney engages in extra-oppositional behavior that provides
an independent basis for termination. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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would prevent the in-house attorney from testifying2"4 in support of her claim or even
revealing information about her claim to her attorney."' Recognition of in-house
counsel's entitlement to Title VII protection therefore requires a reconsideration of
the confidentiality rule in addition to the modifications in the conflict of interest rule
previously described.
Existing elements of the rule and its exceptions argue for a more relaxed
interpretation of the prohibition in the in-house counsel discrimination context. Part
(b) of Rule 1.6, which contains limited exceptions to the duty of confidentiality,
expressly permits an attorney to reveal confidences in a dispute between the attorney
and the client.2" The comments to the rule refer to only two scenarios involving this
exception, malpractice claims and fee disputes,2"7 and the exception has often been
viewed as limited to those contexts. 28 However, the language of the exception refers
broadly to an attorney's use of information to "establish a claim or defense!' in a
"controversy between the lawyer and the client."2 A plain reading of the rule would
suggest the exception may be relied upon to alleviate the duty to maintain
confidences where an in-house attorney wishes to bring a discrimination claim
204. The attorney's attempt to testify could be prohibited by the attorney-client privilege as
well. However, since the prohibition embodied in the confidentiality rules is substantially
broader than the privilege, this subpart will focus on the treatment of the former. For a general
discussion of the distinctions between the privilege and the duty of confidentiality, see
generally X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1304-08 (E.D. Va. 1992).
205. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6; discussion supra Part I.B.2.
206. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
207. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 19.
208. See Weaver, supra note 121, at 521 n.143.
209. The full text of the exception provides:
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(b). This version of the text clearly expands the scope
of the predecessor section in the Model Code which limited the exception to the two cited
examples: "A lawyer may reveal ... confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his
fee or to defend himself against an accusation ofwrongful conduct." MODEL CODE, supra note
195, Rule 4-101 (C)(4); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 Model
Code Comparison (1983) ("Paragraph (b)(2) enlarges the exception to include disclosure of
information relating to claims by the lawyer other than for the lawyer's fee; for example,
recovery of property from the client."). What is unclear, however, is how broad the expanded
exception is intended to reach and, hence, whether it applies in an attorney-client employment
dispute. See Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys. Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 179-80 (3d. Cir. 1997) (finding
exceptions to Pennsylvania version of Rule 1.6(b)(2) inconclusive on whether terminated
attorney may reveal confidences in pursuit of Title VII retaliation claim); WOLFRAM, supra
note 47, § 6.7.8 n.3 ("The point of the broader language in... Model Rule [1.6] is unclear.").
See generally Weaver, supra note 121, at 520 n.143 (comparing clauses of Rule 1.6(b)).
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against her client.21
One need not rely, however, on the breadth of the language or risk an interpretation
that permits a lesser degree of compliance in any dispute between lawyer and client
in order to read the existing exception as embracing discrimination suits. The claims
expressly excepted in the comments, fee and malpractice matters, are those that
implicate the attorney's ability to practice and earn a living, interests that the Model
Rules recognize and see the need to accommodate in defining ethical behavior.2" '
That fee and malpractice matters are the only claims identified makes sense in light
of what the ethical rules currently understand to be the extent of the client's
responsibility to ensure that the attorney's personal interests are satisfied and
protected. This Article has argued, however, that at least in the in-house counsel
context, the notion of client responsibility must be expanded to account for the loss
of control and increase in rights associated with the attorney's status as an employee.
If in recognizing these differences more extensive obligations are imposed on the
client, including the responsibility to ensure that the attorney performs her duties free
from unlawful discrimination, it is rational to recognize a related confidentiality
exception that will permit the attorney to utilize the necessary resources to enforce
those responsibilities where the client fails to uphold them." 2
Recognizing a theoretical and doctrinal basis for an extended exception, however,
does not tell attorneys what information may be revealed or reassure clients that their
interests in confidentiality will be protected. In general, when relying on a
confidentiality exception, an attorney may reveal information only to the extent she
reasonably believes necessary to advance the purpose giving rise to the disclosure.2 3
Because it would be permissible in the discrimination context for in-house counsel
to continue to perform as an attorney under the amended loyalty regime previously
discussed,2 4 more specific and perhaps more restrictive limitations are appropriate.
A means of striking a balance between the client's interest in non-disclosure and
the attorney's need to pursue her claim lies in the rule's own definition of confidential
210. See Philadelphia Bar Assoc. Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 99-6 (Aug. 1999)
(citing Pennsylvania "claim or defense" exception to confidentiality rule in advising that
former in-house attorney may make limited use of confidential or privileged information in
pursuit of wrongful discharge claim); Weaver, supra note 121, at 535-36 (advocating for
similar interpretation of 1.6(b)(2) exception).
211. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, pmbl. (recognizing that "[v]irtually all difficult
ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal
system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a
satisfactory living").
212. In the same way, thejustification for expanding the exception may be phrased directly
in terms of the modification to the loyalty obligation previously proposed. See discussion infra
Part III.B.1. Such an articulation recognizes that the duty of confidentiality is an aspect of the
duty of loyalty in that the prohibition is on betraying the client by revealing confidences. See
Patterson, supra note 47, at 914-45 (tracing the development of the duty of confidentiality as
a separate ethical responsibility). If the ability to bring a claim is excepted from the loyalty
obligation, so to should be the use of information to support it.
213. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(b); id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 18 ("[D]isclosure
should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence.).
214. See supra Part III.B.I.
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information as information "relat[ed] to the representation."2 5 Since in-house counsel
are hired as attorneys to represent the company, one might argue that any information
related to the client or received by the attorney on the job is within the scope of the
rule. However, such an interpretation wrongly supposes that everything in-house
counsel does for or with the client is in the nature of legal representation. In-house
counsel also acquire information and make observations related to their own
employment as distinct from their work function. An understanding of what
information may be revealed in a discrimination case should be based on this
distinction.
While it may not be easy in every case to distinguish between information related
to the attorney's employment by the company as opposed to her representation of the
company as a client, that difficulty is hardly unique to the in-house counsel
discrimination context.216 Certain guidelines can be identified based on the evidence
that in-house counsel is likely to use to pursue such a claim. An in-house attorney
should not be permitted to reveal information regarding the employer's handling of
fair employment practices issues, which the attorney acquired through her legal work
or by virtue of her presence in the corporate legal department. This would encompass
such things as information about confidential client hiring practices, affirmative
action and personnel policies not available to other employees, past or pending
discrimination complaints or other employment-related claims, and company
procedures for responding to employee complaints. Such information should not be
disclosed because it would clearly be related to the attorney's representation of the
client.2" On the other hand, information about the in-house attorney's experience in
the workplace, which ultimately forms the subject of the lawsuit, should not be
considered confidential because such information pertains to the in-house attorney's
treatment as an employee. Such information would include, among other things,
information about perceived instances of discrimination or harassment, discussions
about the attorney's performance, any complaints made by the attorney, and any
responses by the company.' To the extent it is unclear whether information derives
215. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(a).
216. The problem of separating tie in-house attorney's multiple functions has been
particularly difficult with respect to client attempts to invoke the attorney-client privilege. See
generally Giesel, supra note 8, at 1190-1203 (describing court confusion in attempting to
distinguish between communications related to in-house counsel's legal representation and
those pertaining to business matters). The difficulty of making such determinations should not
be a reason for rejecting the distinction. Cf. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173,
181-82 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing to bar former in-house attorney's Title VII suit based on claims
of attorney-client privilege noting that "there may be a fine but relevant line to draw between
the fact that... [plaintiff in-house attorney] took positions on certain legal issues involving
... [company] policies, and the substance of her legal opinions").
217. The majority of this information would also be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (E.D. Va. 1992) (privilege applies
where "the party invoking the privilege consulted an attorney for the purpose of securing a
legal opinion or services and in connection with that consultation communicated information
intended to be kept confidential").
218. Cf Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 181 ("[I]t is difficult to see how statements made to ...
[plaintiff-in-house attorney] and other evidence offered in relation to her own employment and
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from in-house counsel's employment relationship or her representation of the
company,219 in-house counsel should err on the side of ethics and not reveal the
information, leaving her attorney to obtain relevant discovery without her
assistance.' 0 In all cases, the client-employer would have the ability to seek
protective measures from the court to ensure that confidential information is not
disclosed outside the proceeding.21
Thus, as the existing exceptions to the confidentiality rule suggest, an attorney's
obligation to maintain client confidences must be limited to some degree by her need
to protect her own interests. By its nature, information sought to be presented by an
in-house attorney in a discrimination suit will be information that the client-employer
wishes to keep confidential. Once an attorney's right to initiate a claim is recognized
as being within the bounds of her ethical duties, the employer should not be permitted
to hamstring her effort to pursue the claim based solely on her status as an attorney.
Rather than adhering strictly to the broad interpretation of confidential information,
the approach discussed here proposes a more literal reading of Rule 1.6 that accounts
for in-house counsel's employment relationship with the company and permits the
attorney to reveal and freely testify about the treatment she experienced that forms
the substance of her claim.
her own prospects in the company would implicate the attorney-client privilege.");
Breckinridge v. Bristol-Myers Co., 624 F. Supp. 79, 82 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (noting that
conversations between in-house counsel and client-employer regarding the former's retirement
plans were "conversations between an employer and an employee who happened to be an
attorney" and not subject to attorney-client privilege).
219. For instance, an in-house attorney might have information about personnel policies and
practices that is within the knowledge of nonlegal personnel, or it may be commonly known
among company employees that a certain employee has previously been accused of
harassment. Cf. Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 181 (finding it "questionable whether information that
was generally observable to... [plaintiff in-house attorney] as an employee of the company,
such as her observations concerning the lack of women in a... [company] subsidiary, would
implicate the... [attorney-client] privilege").
220. While the in-house attorney could not reveal or testify about such information, nothing
would prohibit the attorney representing in-house counsel from obtaining relevant discovery
and introducing information into evidence through other witnesses. However, the attorney
representing in-house counsel might have separate ethical obligations not to request or utilize
confidential client information improperly revealed by in-house counsel. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 10, Rule 8.3(a) ("A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed
a violation of the [Model Rules] that raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.").
221. See, e.g., Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 182 (recommending use of equitable measures
including "'sealing and protective orders, limited admissibility of evidence, restrictions on use
of testimony in successive proceedings, and... in camera proceedings' in attempt to balance
need for protection of sensitive client information with right of former in-house attorney to
maintain discrimination suit) (omission added) (quoting General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior
Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal. 1994)).
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CONCLUSION
An exploration of the conflict between the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the case of in-house counsel uncovers
fundamental questions about the limits of the duty of loyalty and the extent to which
individual interests should be considered in delineating the scope of professional
responsibility generally. This Article has sought to deconstruct governing principles
of ethics that would preclude an exercise of individual rights by in-house counsel by
locating the existing rule scheme in an image of the professional relationship in which
the attorney wields substantial power over a vulnerable client. This image and the
rules that flow from it are ill-suited to the realities of modem legal practice and fail
to account for in-house counsel's legitimate need for job protection in a situation
where she acts and is treated as much as an employee as an attorney. The Article has
advocated instead for an alternative allocation of responsibility between attorney and
client in which the client's use and retention of in-house counsel, who will assume
professional obligations toward the client, create a concomitant obligation on the part
of the client to maintain and protect the attorney's ability to perform in the workplace.
Whether the concept of a balance of responsibilities between attorney and client
might apply equally in other contexts may well be a subject for further speculation
and research. At least in the discrimination situation, such an approach is
administerially feasible and morally justified as a means both of protecting in-house
attorneys and encouraging corporate compliance with the federal discrimination laws.
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